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I. INTRODUCTION
Sheila McClenton and her four children qualified for Section VIII
housing assistance, but they languished on the Kansas City Housing
Authority's waiting list for three years until funds became available
for them.1 During that time, McClenton and her family waited in the
only housing they could afford: a cramped two-bedroom apartment. 2
When word finally came that housing vouchers were available, Mc-
Clenton began looking for a larger home for her children. She soon
found what seemed like the perfect arrangement: a large three-bed-
room house, complete with a spacious yard, offered for rent by its
owner, Bobby Veal.3 McClenton later explained, "I felt like I would be
able to give my kids what they needed, what they deserved. Instead
... of us being crammed up into a small apartment, I felt like they
could have their own front yard to play in .... It was the ideal home
for me and my kids."4
However, McClenton's hope and optimism faded quickly. During
her first inspection of the house, Veal grabbed her around the waist
from behind. He told McClenton that she was a "nice looking young
lady," and that he was very happy she had inquired about the house.5
McClenton shoved Veal away and told him she was not interested in
"that."6 Despite Veal's advances, McClenton rented the house because
she had few other options: "I desperately needed a place to stay. I
didn't have anywhere to go, and my Section VIII was about to expire."7
Over the course of the next year, Veal's sexual harassment grew
worse. On one occasion, after being let into McClenton's house by her
1. See Transcript of Record at 128, United States v. Veal, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1034
(W.D. Mo. 2004) (No. 02-0720-CR-W-DW) [hereinafter "Veal Transcript of
Record"].
2. Id. at 127-28.
3. At trial, Bobby Veal and his wife, Jewel Veal, were found to have sexually
harassed eleven women who rented housing from them in Kansas City. United
States v. Veal, No. 04-0755-CV-W-DW, 2005 WL 1532748, at *1-2 (W.D. Mo.
June 28, 2005). The Veals were ordered to pay a total of $1,182,804.00 in dam-
ages and civil penalties. Id.
4. Veal Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 128-29.
5. Id. at 126.
6. Id. at 127.
7. Id.
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uncle, Veal came up behind her while she cooked dinner.8 According
to McClenton, "[hie put his hands around me, and he started pressing
up against me, holding me real tight, and I could feel his penis up
against my backside.... He was just moaning and just saying... he
had to have me."9 McClenton pushed him away and told him to
stop. lo Another time, Veal entered McClenton's house unannounced
and without her permission. He grabbed McClenton and tried to force
her into the bedroom, saying he wanted sex." Fighting to resist, Mc-
Clenton screamed and grabbed onto the door frame tightly, breaking
several fingernails. Veal fled when McClenton's children ran into the
hallway.12 Beyond these physical confrontations, Veal made crude
sexual comments around McClenton and repeatedly offered her
money, clothes for herself and her children, and assistance with her
car in exchange for sex. 13 He finally told McClenton that if she did not
relent, she would need to find a new place to live.14 When McClenton
reported the harassment and abuse to her Section VIII caseworker,
the caseworker told McClenton to "get off [her] ass and get a job."'15
Scared for her safety and that of her children, McClenton moved
her family out of the house she rented from Veal after just one year.16
With no other place to go, she moved into her mother's three-bedroom
house, which she then shared with thirteen other people: her own four
children, her mother and father, her brother and sister, three nieces
and nephews, and two uncles.' 7 McClenton thought about the abuse
she suffered at Veal's hands "all the time," crying during the day and
waking up at night with vivid dreams that Veal was storming into her
house.' 8 She also became extremely worried about her own three
daughters, not wanting to let them go out alone or to after-school ac-
tivities.19 When asked why she did not report Veal's abusive conduct
earlier, McClenton recalled that it was hard to disclose the harass-
ment "[b]ecause I was trying to prove to not only myself, but my
mother, my brothers and sisters, that I was a... big enough person to
go out there and find something and be responsible for something and
raise my kids."20
8. Id. at 130.
9. Veal Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 130-31.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 133-34.
12. Id. at 134.
13. Id. at 135-36.
14. Veal Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 139-40.
15. Id. at 144.
16. Id. at 142.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 148-50.
19. Veal Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 150-51.
20. Id. at 147.
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McClenton's disturbing story is not unique. Although sexual har-
assment in the employment context receives considerable attention
both in popular culture 2 1 and in the justice system,22 a significant
number of victims endure sexual harassment at home, in silence, and
without legal recourse. More often than not, such victims share simi-
lar characteristics: they are usually poor, often with young children,
and frequently nonwhite. Many victims are so poor that they qualify
for governmental housing benefits. Furthermore, it is not unusual for
such victims to have recently lived with friends or family members or
to have been homeless. Their desperation for housing is usually re-
lated to concern not for their own well-being, but rather for their chil-
dren. More than anything, they want to keep a decent roof over their
families' heads.
Victims of sexual harassment in housing are not selected at ran-
dom. The characteristics they share in common are the same charac-
teristics that make them both attractive and vulnerable to predatory
landlords. Because of their poverty, isolation, and desperation, they
are more willing to comply and endure than report the harasser or
assert their legal rights. Ultimately, they fear the consequences of re-
sisting the harassment-the loss of their current housing, potential
blacklisting in the local housing community, and possible termination
of governmental housing benefits-more than the harassment itself.
In this way, sexual harassment in housing 23 is meaningfully different
than other forms of residential harassment, such as racial, disability,
or national origin harassment. A neighbor who burns a cross in the
lone African-American family's yard is presumably intending to force
that family out of its home. The same result is likely intended when
insults and religious epithets are scrawled outside a Jewish family's
21. Workplace sexual harassment has been the subject of various books and movies.
See, e.g., NORTH COUNTRY (Warner Bros. Pictures 2005); DISCLOSURE (Baltimore
Pictures 1994).
22. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on several cases involving claims of sexual
harassment in the workplace. See, e.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129
(2004); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986). In comparison, the Court has never taken a case involving claims of post-
acquisition harassment of housing occupants, much less a case involving sexual
harassment.
23. Throughout this Article, I refer to the problem of sexual harassment perpetrated
by landlords against existing tenants in terms such as "sexual harassment in
housing" or "residential sexual harassment." Both terms have been used by com-
mentators in analyzing this problem. See, e.g., Jill Maxwell, Sexual Harassment
at Home: Altering the Terms, Conditions and Privileges of Rental Housing for
Section 8 Recipients, 21 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 223, 230-31 (2006) ("sexual harass-
ment in housing"); Nicole A. Forkenbrock Lindemyer, Note, Sexual Harassment
on the Second Shift: The Misfit Application of Title VII Employment Standards to
Title VII Housing Cases, 18 LAW & INEQ. 351 (2000) ("residential sexual harass-
ment"). I use these and similar terms interchangeably.
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house. But the landlord who sexually harasses his tenant is not in-
tending to drive her out; instead, he is attempting to draw her in-to
hold her captive, through the use of psychological, economic, or some-
times legal coercion-to satisfy his own desire to control and exploit.
The primary federal statute combating discrimination in housing
celebrates its fortieth anniversary in 2008. Although the Federal Fair
Housing Act (FHA) does not expressly prohibit harassment of existing
tenants, its broad terms have been interpreted by various courts, be-
ginning in 1983, to protect occupancy. Since that time, federal doc-
trine governing claims of post-acquisition harassment has developed
piecemeal and inconsistently across the federal circuits, with courts
frequently borrowing-often without much thoughtful explanation-
significant theories or legal tests from the Title VII employment con-
text. This process has been made more difficult not simply because of
the lack of clear statutory protection in this area, but also because the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has
never promulgated final rules articulating the precise contours of har-
assment claims under the FHA.
In 2008, the FHA stands at an important crossroads. Although
many federal circuits continue to interpret the statute as protecting
against post-acquisition harassment, including sexual harassment,
concerns have been voiced about exactly how the FHA is applied in
practice. In particular, critics point to the fact that courts weighing
sexual harassment claims often employ a "reasonable person" stan-
dard, which ignores subjective experiences and unfairly tilts the scales
against women, who are the typical victims of such abuse. Other com-
plaints focus on the tendency of many courts to overstate a relatively
weak analogy when importing Title VII legal standards into the hous-
ing context. Some say this has resulted in the systematic undervalu-
ing of the home as the locus of harassment. Unlike the work setting,
the home has significant emotional and psychological importance for
its occupants, which should be-but often is not-a fundamental com-
ponent in calculating the severity of harassing conduct. Most troub-
ling, some federal courts have begun expressing especially narrow
interpretations of the FHA itself, reasoning that the statute guaran-
tees only a non-discriminatory real estate transaction, not protection
against harassment occurring after occupancy begins. 2 4 Such conclu-
sions seriously undercut fundamental civil rights protections and
leave victims of residential sexual harassment potentially without a
federal civil remedy.
Recognizing the various shortcomings of the FHA when applied in
the context of post-acquisition harassment in general, and sexual har-
24. See, e.g., Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir.
2004).
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assment in particular, this Article explores an alternative vehicle for
victims of such abuse: the Thirteenth Amendment. Ratified in 1865,
the Thirteenth Amendment provided a formal legal end to African
chattel slavery across the United States. But the Thirteenth Amend-
ment has legal importance beyond the abolition of slavery. The
Amendment was and remains both a powerful liberating force and a
guarantor of fundamental rights for all Americans. In particular, the
text of the Thirteenth Amendment extends its reach beyond slavery to
explicitly prohibit all forms of involuntary servitude, regardless of the
victim's race, gender, or socio-economic background. 2 5 The true
breadth of the Amendment makes it an important tool in the eradica-
tion of modern forms of involuntary servitude-including the abusive
and sexually coercive relationships that can be created between land-
lords and their poor, marginalized victims.
Section II begins the analysis by defining what constitutes sexual
harassment in the housing context and attempting to quantify the
problem using measurements based on empirical studies, governmen-
tal and housing advocacy data, and investigative journalism. Section
III briefly outlines the traditional vehicle for bringing claims of resi-
dential sexual harassment in federal court, the FHA, as well as its
potential shortcomings and limitations in this context- including the
argument gaining traction with some federal courts that the FHA has
no application whatsoever to claims of post-acquisition harassment.
Against that backdrop, Section IV explores the possible applicability
of the Thirteenth Amendment to claims of sexual harassment in hous-
ing. In particular, Section IV calls for a broad but textually accurate
reading of the Thirteenth Amendment to trigger the full extent of the
Amendment's protections. Through the lens of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, sexual harassment of low-income, vulnerable women can rea-
sonably be viewed as involuntary servitude.
II. QUALIFYING AND QUANTIFYING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN HOUSING
Before considering traditional and alternative legal methods of
combating sexual harassment in housing, this section seeks to both
define and accurately quantify the problem. While the former task is
relatively straightforward, the latter is surprisingly difficult.
25. Furthermore, the Amendment is properly interpreted as also directly prohibiting
"badges and incidents of slavery"-those burdens or disabilities that helped per-
petuate and were fundamental to slavery in the United States and that are suf-
fered today in a modern context. See infra note 178.
2008]
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A. What Constitutes Residential Sexual Harassment?
Sexual harassment in housing encompasses a wide range of sexu-
ally abusive conduct perpetrated by someone unrelated to the vic-
tim, 26 where the harassment invades the sanctity of the home. 27 A
helpful starting point in defining the problem may be the existing le-
gal framework, which has developed over the past thirty years. Per-
haps surprisingly, the primary federal anti-discrimination laws that
apply to housing-the FHA and its implementing regulations promul-
gated by HUD-contain no definition of or even any explicit prohibi-
tion against sexual harassment. Instead, as a result of amendments
to the FHA in 1974,28 federal law explicitly prohibits various forms of
discrimination-such as refusals to sell or rent or modifications to
housing terms or conditions-based on sex.29 Therefore, sexual har-
assment is prohibited by the FHA to the extent it is considered a type
26. Although most reported cases of residential sexual harassment involve abuse
committed by a landlord against his tenant, such abuse can be and is sometimes
perpetrated by building managers and others in positions of power. See, e.g.,
Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2005) (involving claims of sexual
harassment brought by tenant against apartment manager). For the sake of clar-
ity, references in this Article to perpetrators of sexual harassment in housing are
often to "landlord" but are not intended to exclude others, such as building man-
agers, who commit such abuse.
27. Sexual harassment in the housing context has been the subject of various schol-
arly studies. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual
Harassment at Home, 40 Aiz. L. REV. 17 (1998); Beverly Balos, A Man's Home is
His Castle: How the Law Shelters Domestic Violence & Sexual Harassment, 23 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 77 (2004); Deborah Dubroff, Sexual Harassment, Fair
Housing, and Remedies: Expanding Statutory Remedies Into a Common Law
Framework, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 215 (1997); Theresa Keeley, An Implied
Warranty of Freedom From Sexual Harassment: The Solution for Harassed Te-
nants Where the Fair Housing Act Has Failed, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 397
(2005); Lindemyer, supra note 23; Maxwell, supra note 23; Maggie E. Reed, Linda
L. Collinsworth & Louise F. Fitzgerald, There's No Place Like Home, 11 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 439 (2005); Robert Rosenthal, Landlord Sexual Harassment: A
Federal Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 589 (1992); Robert G. Schwemm & Rigel C.
Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment Under the Fair Housing Act: The For-
gotten Role of§ 3604(c), 2002 Wis. L. REV. 771 (2002); Regina Cahan, Comment,
Home is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing, 1987 Wis. L.
REV. 1061 (1987); Carlotta J. Roos, Note, DiCenso v. Cisneros: An Argument for
Recognizing the Sanctity of the Home in Housing Sexual Harassment Cases, 52 U.
MiAMi L. REV. 1131 (1998).
28. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383 § 808,
88 Stat. 633 (1974).
29. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000) (making it unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent
•.. or otherwise make available or deny a dwelling to any person because of...
sex"); Id. at § 3604(b) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in the "terms, conditions,
or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling.., because of ... sex"); Id. at § 3604(c)
(2000) (making it unlawful to "make, print, or publish.., any notice, statement,
or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates
any preference ... based on ... sex").
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of sex-based housing discrimination. 3 0 As courts have developed the
nuances of sexual harassment law under the FHA, they have relied
heavily on generally analogous law in the Title VII employment con-
text.3 1 In particular, some courts have imported into housing litiga-
tion the two forms of sexual harassment recognized under Title VII:
"quid pro quo" and hostile environment sexual harassment. 3 2
Within this general legal framework a wide range of conduct could
be considered sexually harassing. 33 Some women may endure sugges-
tive or vulgar comments from their landlords.3 4 Although purely ver-
bal abuse may be relatively mild in some cases,3 5 it can also turn
threatening and frightening. In one case, for example, a white land-
lord threatened a black tenant with both rape and lynching.3 6 More
aggressive conduct might include repeated requests for dates, even
when the tenant has indicated that she is not interested. 3 7 Perpetra-
30. See, e.g., Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the
FHA's prohibition of discrimination based on sex includes a prohibition of sexual
harassment); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (ex-
plaining that "it is beyond question that sexual harassment is a form of
discrimination").
31. Sexual harassment within the work environment is prohibited under Title VII as
a form of sex-based discrimination. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 66 (1986).
32. See Shellhammer v. Lewallen, 770 F.2d 167 (N.D. Ohio 1983), affd without opin-
ion, 770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1007-08
(7th Cir. 1996); Honce, 1 F.3d at 1088-90.
33. See generally, Cahan, supra note 27, at 1064-65 (providing general categories of
sexual harassment in housing). Ms. Cahan's analysis, which pre-dated HUD's
draft rules on sexual harassment, adopted the following definition of sexual har-
assment, which was drawn from the United States Merit Systems Protection
Board: "[Dieliberate or repeated unsolicited verbal comments, gestures or physi-
cal contact of a sexual nature that is considered to be unwelcome by the recipi-
ent." Id. at 1062-63 (citation omitted).
34. See, e.g., Gnerre v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 524 N.E.2d 84, 86
(Mass. 1988) (including allegations that the landlord harassed his tenant with
questions like, "How many times did you get laid this week?" and "I got a big
sausage, you want?"); see also, Reed, Collinsworth & Fitzgerald, supra note 27, at
434-62. The Reed, Collinsworth, and Fitzgerald study reviewed approximately
3,500 pages of sworn testimony provided by 39 victim witnesses in residential
sexual harassment lawsuits to analyze, among other things, the type and nature
of sexually harassing conduct in such cases. See id. at 446-47. Among the verbal
abuse identified in such cases were comments about the tenant's body, in general,
or her genitals; "[d]irty talk / general sexual comments"; and sexist or threaten-
ing comments. Id. at 448.
35. See, e.g., Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1395 (alleging that the landlord made "off-
color, flirtatious and unwelcome remarks").
36. Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condo. Unit Owners Ass'n, No. CIV. A. 96-2495RMU,
1997 WL 1877201 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997); see also DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1006 (in-
cluding allegations that the landlord called his tenant a "bitch" and a "whore"
when she declined his sexual advances).
37. See, e.g., Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1087 (10th Cir. 1993); Glover v. Jones, No.
05-CV-6124(CJS), 2006 WL 3207506, at *1-2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006); Rich v.
2008]
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tors may also seek to coerce sexual conduct from tenants, promising
gifts, a reduction in rent, or forgiveness of an existing debt.38 Exploit-
ing the financial vulnerability of the victim,3 9 an abuser might
threaten eviction, a loss of government housing benefits, refusal to un-
dertake needed repairs, or other negative consequences if the tenant
does not relent.40 In one case, for example, the landlord told his ten-
ant that she would be able to keep her apartment only if she had sex
with him once a month.4 1 Perpetrators may also stalk their victims.42
Escalating abuse includes a wide range of physical contact-ranging
from the landlord putting his arm around the tenant, to grabbing her
breasts or buttocks or kissing her without her consent, to rape.43
Abusers often exploit their position of power and control to gain
access to the victim. 4 4 In particular, predatory landlords frequently
use master keys to enter victims' dwellings without their consent or to
abuse victims after initially entering their residences for the purpose
Lubin, No. 02 Civ. 6786(TPG), 2004 WL 1124662 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004); see
also Reed, Collinsworth & Fitzgerald, supra note 27, at 448.
38. See, e.g., Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 1997) (alleging that the
abusive landlord promised the plaintiff that she could "pay money on the side" or
"fool around or something" to make up a $100 shortfall in rent); DiCenso, 96 F.3d
at 1006 (including allegations that the landlord promised the tenant that she
could take care of rent "in other ways").
39. Victims of residential sexual harassment are disproportionately poor. See gener-
ally, Adams, supra note 27, at 31-38; Balos, supra note 27, at 96-98; Maxwell,
supra note 23, at 233-35; Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Socioeconomic
Class and Gender in Hostile Housing Environment Claims Under Title VII: Who
is the Reasonable Person? 38 B.C. L. REV. 861, 884 (1996-97).
40. See, e.g., Doe v. Maywood Hous. Auth., No. 93 C 2865, 1993 WL 243384, at *1
(N.D. Ill. July 1, 1993) (threatening to terminate victim's housing assistance eli-
gibility unless she gave in to sexual demands); Grieger v. Sheets, No. 87 C 6567,
1989 WL 38707, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1989) (alleging that when the victim
rejected the landlord's sexual advances, he stopped making needed repairs in her
apartment and threatened her Section VIII assistance); see also Reed, Collin-
sworth & Fitzgerald, supra note 27, at 448.
41. See Grieger, 1989 WL 38707, at *1.
42. See, e.g., Maze v. Krueger, HUDALJ 05-93-0196-1, 1996 WL 418886, at *4
(HUDALJ June 7, 1996); see also Reed, Collinsworth & Fitzgerald, supra note 27,
at 448.
43. See, e.g., Glover, 2006 WL 3207506, at *1-2 (involving the perpetrator putting his
arm around the victim and kissing her); Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-
10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005) (alleging that the defen-
dant physically attacked the plaintiff, including kissing and fondling her, while
making lewd remarks); Maze, 1996 WL 418886, at *1 (stating that the perpetra-
tor made physical advances by touching and grabbing the victim); Szkoda v. Ill.
Human Rights Comm'n, 706 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (alleging that the
landlord touched the victim's breasts).
44. See Maxwell, supra note 23, at 230-31. Beyond the physical access that most
landlords have to their tenants' apartments, landlords "also have regular oppor-
tunities for interaction when they make repairs, collect rent, or show units to
prospective tenants." Id. at 231; Adams, supra note 27, at 33-35.
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of making repairs or discussing rent.4 5 In one case, a landlord used
his own key to access the victim's apartment while she was there
alone taking a bath.46 All of this abusive conduct occurs in or near the
home, and may occur in the presence of the victim's young children.47
The nature and location of the abuse create significant fear in the vic-
tim, both for her own safety and for that of her family, as well as a
sense of powerlessness, isolation, and helplessness. One victim of sex-
ual harassment at the hands of her landlord, including incidents per-
petrated in front of her young son, described herself as feeling
"terribly embarrassed," "degraded," "cheap," and "terrified."4s
The damage caused by residential sexual harassment is amplified
given the location of the abuse. The home has traditionally been
viewed and experienced as a place of refuge, safety, comfort, and an
intensely private location where we care for our families and recover
from the challenges of our public lives. 49 At its core, the home is inti-
mate and isolated from the outside world, except for those people vol-
untarily allowed in. When landlords sexually harass within this
context, their behavior carries with it the added harm of destroying
the victim's sense of solitude and protection-injuries that are in-
tensely personal to the particular victim. 5 0 As a result, the harass-
ment and abuse they suffer in this context is especially damaging.
B. Measuring the Incidence
1. Empirical Studies
Although employment-based sexual harassment has been the sub-
ject of considerable empirical study over many years, sexual harass-
45. See Richards, 2005 WL 1065141 (perpetrator exposed himself to the victim after
she allowed him entry to undertake a needed repair); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F.
Supp. 1393, 1395 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (including allegations that the landlord pro-
positioned and assaulted the tenant after he gained entry to her apartment to
repair her bathroom); Szkoda, 706 N.E.2d 962 (indicating that the defendant re-
peatedly propositioned the victim after gaining access to her apartment to repair
the stove); Dubois v. House, No. 95 C 0683, 1995 WL 680639 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14,
1995); Chomicki v. Wittekind, 381 N.W.2d 561 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
46. Maze, 1996 WL 418886, at *4.
47. See, e.g., id. at *1; Gnerre v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 524 N.E.2d
84, 86 (Mass. 1988) (including allegations that the landlord told his tenant, "Nice
pair of tits, honey," in front of the victim's young son).
48. Gnerre, 524 N.E.2d at 86.
49. See Adams, supra note 27, at 22-23; D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Con-
cept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 255, 276-77 (2006).
50. See generally, Lindemyer, supra note 23, at 371. Where the victim is nonwhite,
the importance of the home environment may be increased. According to one
scholar, for African-Americans, "home often represents the only reliable anchor
available to them in a hostile white-dominated world." Joe R. Feagin, A House is
Not a Home: White Racism and U.S. Housing Practices, in RESIDENTIAL
APARTHEID: THE AMERICAN LEGACY 20 (Robert D. Bullard et al. eds., 1994).
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ment in housing has received almost no similar attention. In the
words of one researcher, sexual harassment "in rental housing is a
virtually unresearched phenomenon." 5 1
The only widely available empirical study on the subject was
presented in a 1987 law review article by Regina Cahan.5 2 The Cahan
study, which sought to "determine the number of sexual harassment
complaints received and to analyze specific characteristics of the com-
plaints,"53 was circulated to 150 fair housing advocacy organizations
and agencies across the country.54 Ninety-six entities responded to
the survey, with fifty-seven providing usable data and reporting that
they had received complaints of sexual harassment in housing.55
Those fifty-seven housing organizations and agencies reported a total
of 288 incidents of sexual harassment. 56 Although there may be draw-
backs in relying too heavily on the Cahan study,5 7 several of its find-
ings are illuminating.
For example, the study clearly reveals that sexual harassment in
housing is a problem suffered primarily by the poor. Seventy-five per-
cent of women who identified themselves as victims of sexual harass-
ment earned less than $10,000 per year; twenty-three percent earned
between $10,000 and $20,000 per year; and two percent earned be-
tween $20,000 and $30,000 per year. 58 In addition, sexual harass-
ment identified by the Cahan study most often occurred in the small
apartment, duplex, or private home rental context. 59 As a result, the
harasser was usually the owner of the property, further worsening the
power imbalance between the parties and increasing the risk that the
victim might suffer housing-related retaliation if she complained. Fi-
nally, the Cahan study indicates that much of the sexual harassment
51. Reed, Collinsworth & Fitzgerald, supra note 27, at 439.
52. Cahan, supra note 27.
53. Id. at 1066.
54. Id.
55. Id. Thirty respondents reported that they had received no complaints of sexual
harassment in housing. See id.
56. Id.
57. Beyond the fact that Ms. Cahan's study is now over twenty years old, it surveyed
only "fair housing centers, agencies, and organizations across the country,"
rather than actual victims of harassment. Id. at 1066. As a result, Ms. Cahan's
study likely undercounts sexual harassment in housing, for numerous reasons,
including victims not fully understanding their legal rights or being unwilling to
report abuse to relevant agencies or organizations because of a fear of retaliation
or blacklisting. Another limiting factor in the Cahan study is that not all re-
sponding organizations or agencies included specific characteristics of the victims
or details of the alleged incidents. See id. at 1067 n.18.
58. Cahan, supra note 27, at 1067.
59. Id. at 1074.
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suffered by female renters is of a relatively short duration:60 35% of
reported incidents of sexual harassment lasted one day.6 1
2. Official Data
Data generated by housing advocacy groups, state and local civil
rights commissions, and HUD provide a further window into the prob-
lem of residential sexual harassment. In general terms, discrimina-
tion based on sex or gender appears to account for up to approximately
10% to 12% of the housing-related claims that such groups investi-
gate. At the state level, for example, the Illinois Department of
Human Rights reported that from 2002 to 2005, between 3% and 12%
of its housing discrimination charges involved allegations of sex dis-
crimination. 62 In Hawaii, the most recent annual report of the Civil
Rights Commission indicates that 5.4% of housing discrimination
cases accepted by the commission involved the status of "sex."63 Texas
statistics are consistent with these numbers, reflecting that 8% and
6% of statewide housing complaints filed with the Texas Commission
on Human Rights in 2005 and 2006, respectively, were on the basis of
"sex."64 California data are similar: between 4% and 5% of the hous-
ing cases filed by the state Department of Fair Employment and
Housing in the years 2001 to 2004 involved sexual harassment
allegations.65
60. See id. at 1073. The forty-three incidents of sexual harassment that were catego-
rized in the Cahan study were broken down according to the following durations:
"One day" (15); "One week" (3); "1-3 months" (9); "4-6 months" (8); "7-10 months"
(1); "11 months -1 year" (2); 'More than one year" (5). Id.
61. Id.
62. ILL. DEP'T OF HuMAN RIGHTS ANN. REP. 34 (2002-2004), available at http://www.
state.il.us/dhr/Publications/AnnualReport_02_04.pdf; ILL. DEP'T OF HuMAN
RIGHTS, ANN. REP. 21 (2005), available at http://www.state.il.us/dhr/Publications/
AnnualRpt.-2005.pdf. Under Illinois law, a complainant has up to one year after
an alleged civil rights violation to file a charge with the Fair Housing Division.
See id. at 18. Docketed charges are then investigated by the Fair Housing Divi-
sion, leading to dismissal of the charge, conciliation, or administrative action.
See id.
63. HAw. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N ANN. REP. 18 (2001-2002), available at http://www.
state.hi.us/hcrc/report2002.htm.
64. TEx. WORKFORCE COMM'N, CML RIGHTS Div., COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS ANN.
REP. 10 (2005), available at http://www.twc.state.tx.us/crd/arcrd-05.pdf; TEX.
WORKFORCE COMM'N, CIVIL RIGHTS Div., COMM'N ON HUMAN RIGHTS ANN. REP. 8
(2006), available at http://www.twc.state.tx.us/crd/arcrd-06.pdf. Similar data
were reflected at the city level in Fort Worth, where 8% of the housing cases
investigated by the city's Human Relations Commission in 2005-2006 involved
"sex" as the basis. See CITY OF FORT WORTH HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, ANN. REP. at
5 (2005-2006).
65. Forms on File with Author. Of the 1,203 housing cases filed by the CDFEH in
2004, 50 were categorized under sexual harassment (4%). Data from other years
included 46 of 1,176 cases in 2003 (4%); 44 of 1,109 cases in 2002 (4%); and 52 of
1,124 cases in 2001 (5%).
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At the federal level, discrimination complaints on the basis of sex
generally track those received by state agencies. From 2003 to 2006,
HUD received over 2,200 complaints each year regarding perceived
acts of housing discrimination. 66 Between 10% and 12% of those com-
plaints alleged sex as a basis of discrimination. 67 Similarly, according
to the National Fair Housing Alliance, a consortium of over 220 pri-
vate, non-profit fair housing organizations and state and local civil
rights agencies, housing complaints filed on the basis of sex range
from 4% to 7% each year.6 8
As the preceding two paragraphs suggest, a considerable amount
of data exists to quantify claims of sex discrimination in housing at
the federal and state levels. However, the same reports and studies
that provide information about sex discrimination are conspicuously
silent on the subtopic of sexual harassment in housing. Of the reports
reviewed, California's state report is the lone exception to this rule,
providing specific data on allegations of sexual harassment. 69 These
omissions likely have a foundation grounded in the language of both
the FHA and HUD's implementing regulations.
As discussed earlier, the FHA prohibits various forms of discrimi-
natory conduct based on "sex,"70 but does not expressly reference or
prohibit harassment of any kind.71 In fact, harassment is never men-
tioned in the FHA. The rules promulgated by HUD to implement the
66. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., ANN. REP. ON THE STATE OF FAIR Hous-
ING IN AMERICA 23 (2006), available at http'/hud.gov/offices/fheo/fy2006rpt.pdf
[hereafter "2006 STATE OF FAIR HOusING"].
67. See id.
68. See NAT'L FAIR Hous. ALLIANCE FAIR Hous. TRENDS REP. 19 (2006) available at
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/resources/newsArchive/resource_2425680275
4560627686.pdf (4%); NAT'L FAIR Hous. ALLIANCE, FAIR Hous. TRENDS REP. 9
(2005), available at http'//www.nationalfairhousing.org/resources/newsArchive/
2005%2OTrends%2OReport.pdf (5%); NAT'L FAIR Hous. ALLIANCE, FAIR Hous.
TRENDS REP. 6 (2004), available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/resources/
newsArchive/NFHA%202004%20Trends%20Report.pdf (4%); NAT'L FAIR Hous.
ALLLANCE, FAIR Hous. TRENDS REP. 3 (2003), available at http://www.nationalfair
housing.org/resources/newsArchive/2003%2OTrends%Report.pdf (4%); NAT'L FAIR
Hous. ALLIANCE, FAIR Hous. TRENDS REP. 2 (2002), available at http://www.na-
tionalfairshousing.org/resources/newsArchive/2002%2OTrends%2OReport.pdf
(7%).
69. See supra note 65, at 15-16. HUD's 2006 Annual Report provides a summary of
"HUD v. Calvert," a case in which HUD's investigation revealed that a property
manager made "unwelcome sexual advances" to at least seven tenants. 2006
STATE OF FAIR HOUSING, supra note 66, at 22. Although the summary is entitled
"HUD Charges Property Manager with Sexually Harassing a Female Tenant,"
the text indicates that HUD charged the manager with violations of the FHA for
"discriminating against [a tenant] based on her sex." Id.
70. See supra Subsection II.A.
71. The closest express prohibition of harassing behavior may exist in 42 U.S.C.
§ 3617 (2000), which makes it unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or inter-
fere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having
[Vol. 86:838
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HOUSING
FHA are consistent in their phrasing and terminology-prohibiting
discrimination based on "sex."7 2 Although HUD's FHA rules do pro-
vide one scenario of apparent sexual harassment as an example of con-
duct that would violate the FHA,73 the rules do not expressly identify
sexual harassment as prohibited conduct, much less establish stan-
dards for evaluating allegedly harassing behavior. In 2000, HUD pre-
pared and circulated for comment a draft rule that would have
established such standards; 74 however, a final rule on sexual harass-
ment never emerged from HUD. The categories and labels listed in
the FHA and HUD rules are important because they appear to di-
rectly affect the housing discrimination data compiled at the federal7 5
and state levels.76 As a result, it is impossible to accurately estimate
the incidence of sexual harassment in housing using available federal,
exercised or enjoyed ... any right granted or protected by section 803, 804, 805,
or 806 of this article."
72. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.50(b)(1)-(4), 100.60(a), (b) (2006) (prohibiting various
discriminatory housing activities on the basis of "sex").
73. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(5) (2006). According to this rule, the following scenario
would violate 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) as imposing discriminatory terms or conditions
of housing: "Denying or limiting services or facilities in connection with the sale
or rental of a dwelling, because a person failed or refused to provide sexual fa-
vors." Id.
74. See Fair Housing Act Regulations Amendments Standards Governing Sexual
Harassment Cases, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,666-01 (Nov. 13, 2000) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 100).
75. For example, HUD solicits allegations of housing discrimination using forms that
ask respondents whether they are a "victim of housing discrimination" and spe-
cifically state that it is "unlawful to discriminate in housing based on these fac-
tors[:] race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status (families with
children under the age of 18, or who are expecting a child), [or] handicap (if you or
someone close to you has a disability)." U.S. Dep't of Hous, and Urban Dev.,
Form HUD-903.1, Are You a Victim of Housing Discrimination? (2002), available
at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/formslfiles/903-1.pdf.
76. Under federal rules promulgated by HUD, state and local fair housing agencies
are directed to provide HUD with data "concerning the race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, handicap, and family characteristics of persons and house-
holds" seeking housing-related assistance. 24 C.F.R. § 121.2 (2007). Those demo-
graphic categories identified by HUD coincide with the prohibited bases of
discrimination under the FHA. With only the language of HUD's rules and the
text of the FHA to rely on, state and federal agencies tracking housing discrimi-
nation complaints appear to ignore the subcategory of sexual harassment and
focus exclusively on the broader concept of sex discrimination. A limited sam-
pling of state (Iowa, California, Wisconsin, West Virginia, North Dakota, Dela-
ware) and local (Roanoke, Virginia; Richmond, Virginia; Tacoma, Washington;
Austin, Texas; Phoenix, Arizona; and Orange County, California) fair housing in-
take and complaint forms indicates that none of these agencies explicitly identi-
fies sexual harassment in housing as a potential category of discrimination. See
Forms on file with author. And where these agencies prompt complainants with
questions to identify the exact basis of alleged housing discrimination, none of
them includes any reference to post-acquisition mistreatment, much less sexual
harassment.
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state, and local agency reports on fair housing. At the very least,
those reports may subsume sexual harassment claims into a broader
category of "sex discrimination." More troubling, however, is the pos-
sibility that because relevant agencies may not see an explicit statu-
tory or regulatory proscription against sexual harassment, they are
not adequately educating the public on the prohibited nature of such
behavior or taking steps to facilitate the reporting of violative conduct.
In addition, the data from state and federal agencies almost cer-
tainly reflect a massive underreporting of all forms of housing discrim-
ination. In 2001 and 2005, HUD undertook national surveys to gauge
the American public's knowledge of, and attitude towards, fair hous-
ing laws. 77 The surveys, in part, described ten housing scenarios and
asked respondents whether the facts presented violated any federal
law.78 The surveys then asked what steps respondents would take if
they ever suffered housing discrimination. 79 The surveys also in-
quired whether the respondents had ever suffered housing discrimina-
tion and, if so, what steps the individuals took in response to the
perceived discrimination s 0 When asked how they would respond to
any future acts of housing discrimination, 44% said it was "Very
likely" or "somewhat likely" that they would seek help from a govern-
mental agency.8 1 An even larger percentage-72%-answered that it
was "very likely" or "somewhat likely" that they would consult a law-
yer if they were ever discriminated against in housing.8 2
However, the respondents' apparent willingness to seek help for
any future acts of housing discrimination stands in stark contrast to
their actual behavior when faced with discrimination. Of the respon-
dents who reported experiencing some form of housing discrimination,
only 1% had filed a report with a relevant governmental agency, and
77. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POL'Y DEV. & RES., How
MUCH Do WE KNOW? PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE NATION'S FAIR HOUSING LAWS
(2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/hmwk.pdf [herein-
after, "How MUCH Do WE KNOW?"]; U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE
OF POL'y DEV. & RES., Do WE KNOW MORE Now? TRENDS IN PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE,
SUPPORT AND USE OF FAIR HOUSING LAW (2006) available at http://www.huduser.
org/Publications/pdf/FairHousingSurveyReport.pdf [hereinafter, "Do WE KNOW
MORE Now?"]. Between the 2001 and 2005 studies, HUD "conducted an exten-
sive media campaign focused on recognition and reporting of housing discrimina-
tion." Id. at i.
78. How MUCH Do WE KNOW?, supra note 77, at 7-10; Do WE KNOW MORE Now?,
supra note 77, at 9. None of the scenarios presented in the HUD studies included
harmful conduct occurring post-acquisition. As a result, HUD did not measure
the public's knowledge of federal law as it pertains to harassment.
79. How MUCH Do WE KNOW?, supra note 77, at 27; Do WE KNOW MORE Now?, supra
note 77, at 35-36.
80. How MUCH Do WE KNOW?, supra note 77, at 27; Do WE KNOW MORE Now?, supra
note 77, at 35-36.
81. Do WE KNOW MORE Now?, supra note 77, at 39.
82. Id.
[Vol. 86:838
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HOUSING
less than 2% had met with a lawyer about the perceived discrimina-
tion.S3 The vast majority of people surveyed-between 80% and
90%-did nothing at all in response to the perceived discrimination.8 4
The enormous incongruity between how respondents predict they
would react and how they actually react to housing discrimination has
led HUD to conclude that "underreporting is a major obstacle to
achieving equal opportunity in housing."85
The reasons for such underreporting are varied. Earlier studies of
residential sexual harassment suggested several explanations: women
may feel stigmatized by the harassing conduct; they may fear retalia-
tion against themselves or their children from the perpetrator; they
may see reporting the abuse as prolonging their suffering; or they sim-
ply may not know that what they have suffered is housing discrimina-
tion.8 6 Data from HUD's 2005 survey provide similar explanations:
64% of those surveyed responded that taking steps would not have
been "worth it" or would not have helped the situation8 7 and 8% ex-
pressed some fear of being retaliated against.8 8
3. Case Law
Another-albeit imprecise 8 9-way to evaluate the scope of sexual
harassment in housing is to sort reported judicial and administrative
decisions involving housing harassment by the type of harassment al-
leged. As of the spring of 2007, there existed 106 decisions available
through online searches from federal and state courts and administra-
tive law judges in cases involving some form of housing-related har-
assment (disability, religious, race, country of origin, sexual, or some
combination of bases).90 In those cases, the most frequently alleged
83. Id. at 36.
84. Id.
85. 2006 STATE OF FAIR HOUSING, supra note 66, at 7.
86. See Cahan, supra note 27, at 1066-70. To the extent victims may not know that
sexual harassment in housing violates federal law, HUD does not appear to be
doing much to remedy the situation. As discussed earlier, HUD does not require
its state and local fair housing partners to report data on sexual harassment. See
supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. In addition, it is difficult to estimate
the public's knowledge of post-acquisition harassment protection in this country,
particularly since HUD omitted from its 2001 and 2005 surveys any scenarios
dealing with harassment. See How MUCH Do WE KNow?, supra note 76, at 7-10;
Do WE KNow MORE Now?, supra note 76, at 9.
87. Do WE KNow MORE Now?, supra note 77, at 37.
88. Id.
89. Among other limitations, such an evaluation does not capture harassment dis-
putes never reported to a housing agency or attorney, those never filed in court,
or those filed cases that settle or are abandoned.
90. Study on file with the author. Of the 119 reported decisions, thirteen emanated
from lawsuits that had already generated one reported decision. Those 19 deci-
sions were excluded, leaving a total of 106 judicial decisions from unique housing
harassment disputes.
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single basis of harassment was sexual (37% of reported harassment
decisions), followed closely by race (36%).91 After adding decisions in
which multiple bases of harassment were alleged, a total of 40% of
available housing harassment decisions involved some claim of sexual
harassment committed against an existing occupant. 9 2 For reasons
discussed earlier, although these numbers without question un-
dercount all forms of housing harassment, 93 their relative values do
suggest a general conclusion: sexual harassment, when compared to
other forms of post-acquisition harassment, is a significant societal
problem.
4. Investigative Journalism
Anecdotal evidence provides another window into the problem of
sexual harassment as a form of housing discrimination. Newspaper
reports from across the country strongly suggest at least two conclu-
sions about such harassment. First, landlords who engage in harass-
ing behavior are often repeat offenders. Second, and related, the
victims singled out for harassment by predatory landlords share fun-
damental characteristics.
One of the most striking aspects of many newspaper reports on res-
idential harassment is how frequently an individual landlord faces
multiple allegations of sexual harassment. One investigation in Min-
nesota, for example, identified at least fifteen landlords or property
managers who had been accused of sexually harassing tenants.9 4 One
of the accused landlords had been sued six times and was alleged to
have sexually harassed more than a dozen tenants. 95 Another Minne-
sota landlord settled a sexual harassment dispute with sixteen former
tenants two years after he settled similar claims brought by four other
tenants. 96 In Sacramento, a landlord settled sexual harassment
91. Id.
92. See id. Thirty-nine cases (37%) involved only sexual harassment claims; two
cases involved claims of racial and sexual harassment (2%); and one case involved
claims of race, sexual, and country of origin harassment (1%). Id.
93. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
94. Charles Laszewski, Renters Say Sex Sometimes Part of the Deal, ST. PAUL PIO-
NEER PRESS, Aug. 25, 2002. The allegedly harassing behavior included landlords
making sexual overtures to tenants when they fell behind on rent, inappropriate
touching, and forced sexual contact. See id. See also Paul Gustafson, Landlord to
Settle Harassment Suit, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 2, 2004 (reporting
$425,000 settlement of claims brought by 16 women claiming sexual harassment
by a St. Paul landlord).
95. See Laszewski, supra note 94.
96. Gustafson, supra note 94 (reporting settlement of sexual harassment claims
brought by 16 tenants two years after the same landlord settled sexual harass-
ment claims against four other tenants).
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claims brought by twelve former tenants for $100,000.97 A recent fed-
eral lawsuit accuses a Cincinnati, Ohio, landlord with a pattern of sex-
ual harassment against female tenants over the past nine years,
listing fifty-three properties owned by the landlord.9 8 In a final exam-
ple, a landlord in Kansas City, Missouri, was ordered to pay over $1
million for sexually harassing eleven women.9 9
Investigative reports also highlight the personal dimension to the
problem-in particular, the plight of the individual victim, and the
damage caused to her and her family at the hands of the abuser.
These stories reinforce the common characteristics of the victim of res-
idential sexual harassment. Poverty, in particular, is a recurring
problem for such victims.1 0 0 Because sexual harassment in the resi-
dential context affects female renters, the typical victim is more likely
to earn a low or moderate income. 10 1 She may be the recipient of Sec-
tion VIII housing assistance 10 2 or may have recently lived with her
97. Denny Walsh, Capital Landlord Settles Sexual-Harassment Suit, SACRAMENTO
BEE, April 20, 2004 (describing a Sacramento landlord's $100,000 settlement of
sexual harassment claims brought by twelve former tenants).
98. Landlord Accused of Harassment, THE CINCINNATI POST, Feb. 27, 2007, at 2A.
99. Associated Press, Harassing Tenants Nets $1.1 Million Verdict, HOUSTON CHRON-
ICLE, May 16, 2004. See also Rick Ruggles, Sex-for-Rent Awards Fall Far Short of
Request, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Dec. 10, 2004, at 1B (reporting award of
$66,152 against Omaha, Nebraska landlord who sexually harassed ten former
tenants).
100. Associated Press, Harassing Tenants Nets $1.1 Million Verdict, HOUSTON CHRON-
ICLE, May 16, 2004 (reporting that victims of sexual harassment in housing are
often "lower-income, single women with few opportunities to seek other hous-
ing"). To the extent that poverty plays an important role in creating the ideal
environment for residential sexual harassment, women suffer a distinct disad-
vantage. In general, women are 39% more likely to be poor than men. See LEGAL
MOMENTUM, READING BETWEEN THE LINES: WOMEN'S POVERTY IN THE UNITED
STATES (2004), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/womeninpoverty.pdf.
Among adults who are extremely poor-those whose incomes are less than half of
the poverty standard-60% are women. Id. Women who work outside the home
are 41% more likely to be poor than men who work outside the home. Id. Fami-
lies with single parents are considerably more likely to live in poverty as com-
pared to families with cohabiting married parents, and the poverty rate for
families headed by single mothers is nearly twice that of families headed by sin-
gle men. See id. According to one commentator, "Women . . . are the fastest
growing segment of the homeless and ill-housed in the nation." Adams, supra
note 27, at 34; see Maxwell, supra note 23, at 234.
101. Because sexual harassment affects renters, as opposed to owners, it dispropor-
tionately impacts low- and moderate-income women-the very women with few
housing opportunities. See Maxwell, supra note 23, at 224.
102. See, e.g., Titan Barksdale, HAWS Wants Inquiry; It Will Ask for Investigation of
Sexual-Harassment Suit, WINSTON-SALEM J., Nov. 6, 2006, at B1 (reporting in-
vestigations of claims of sexual harassment brought by women who rented homes
from a landlord through the Housing Authority of Winston-Salem); Suspended
Housing Official Accused of Sexual Harassment, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept.
27, 1994, at 22D (describing an alleged "widespread, pervasive and long-term sex-
for-housing scandal" involving alleged harassment by an official with the Merce-
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children on a relative's front porchlO3 or may be homeless and living
with her family in a welfare hotellO4 or a shelter.O5 The exact details
vary, but the gist of the underlying story is the same: she is suffering
extreme poverty and, as a result, is desperate for housing. Such wo-
men are almost certainly not aware of their legal rights.106 Even if
they are, they may not be willing to risk the loss of housing or govern-
mental assistance for their families that could result if they resist the
harassment or complain to authorities. Furthermore, as the amount
of low income housing decreases across the country, predatory land-
lords have more and more desperate victims to choose from.1o 7 As one
housing attorney stated, "[a] woman has to choose between making
the family homeless or giving in to the landlord."' 0 8
III. THE FHA AS AN IMPERFECT VEHICLE FOR
RESIDENTIAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Before turning to an analysis of the Thirteenth Amendment, this
section briefly considers the continued viability and effectiveness of
the FHA as a vehicle for victims of residential sexual harassment
seeking redress in federal court. Although the FHA has been used by
a number of plaintiffs to bring such claims, several potential problems
exist with the statute in this context. The shortcomings discussed be-
low could be remedied by statutory amendment, the promulgation of
des Housing Authority against applicants for low-income housing); Laszewski,
supra note 94.
103. Esther B. Fein, Complaints Grow as More Tenants Tell of Sexual Harassment by
Landlords, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1986, at 27.
104. Id.
105. Laszewski, supra note 94.
106. This is especially true if, as suggested earlier, HUD and local housing advocacy
groups are not effectively engaging in community outreach and education about
the FHA's prohibition of unlawful post-acquisition harassment. See supra Sub-
section II.B.2.
107. See Elliott D. Lee, Female Tenants Battle Increased Sex Harassment, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 30, 1987, at 25 (reporting that residential sexual harassment "appears to be
intensifying as the number of single women who live alone or with young children
has climbed and the supply of affordable housing has shrunk"). In general, there
is a significant delay for persons seeking government housing assistance. See,
e.g., OAKLAND Hous. AUTH., ANN. REP. (2006), available at http://www.oakha.org/
OhaNews/oha.annual2006.pdf (detailing that over 47,000 applications were sub-
mitted for a waiting list of 10,000 for housing vouchers in Oakland); SAN FRAN-
CISCO AIDS FOUNDATION, HOUSING/RENTAL SUBSIDY, available at http://www.sfaf.
org/serviceshousing-subsidy.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2007) (reporting that
over 27,000 people remained on San Francisco's Section VIII housing voucher
waiting list); PRESS RELEASE, MINN. Hous. P'SHIP, MINNESOTA HOUSING PARTNER-
SHIP SHows THAT THOUSANDS OF MINNESOTANS CONTINUE TO WAIT FOR AFFORDA-
BLE HOUSING (Oct. 20, 2006), available at http://www.mhponline.org/files/Section
8report.pdf (stating that 47,000 individuals and families were stranded on the
state Section VIII waiting list).
108. See Laszewski, supra note 94.
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clearer implementing rules, or perhaps even more effective advocacy;
nevertheless, these limitations call into question whether the FHA in
its current form adequately protects victims of sexual harassment.
A. Transactional Nature of the FHA
Since its enactment in 1968, the FHA has served as the primary
vehicle for bringing claims of housing discrimination in federal court.
Much litigation under the FHA has addressed what might be termed
access-related claims, such as allegations of racial steering,1 0 9 dis-
criminatory lending and financing practices,1 1 0 failure to rent or
sell,"' discrimination in advertisements,112 and discriminatory sales
or rental terms. 113 The FHA has also been interpreted by a number of
courts to include basic guarantees of occupancy, use, and enjoyment
that arise post-acquisition.1 14 As expressed by one district court con-
sidering the scope of the FHA, "it is difficult to imagine a privilege
that flows more naturally from the purchase or rental of a dwelling
than the privilege of residing therein; therefore, [the FHA] should be
(and has been) read to permit the enjoyment of this privilege without
discriminatory harassment." i" 5
In the last several years, however, some concern has arisen about
the true post-acquisition scope of the FHA. This concern is reflected
in a number of federal decisions that narrowly interpret specific provi-
sions of the FHA to apply only to claims of discrimination in the sales
109. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); City of Chicago v.
Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc., 982 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1992).
110. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1999); Edwards v. Flagstar
Bank, 109 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
111. See, e.g., Rogers v. 66-36 Yellowstone Blvd. Coop Owners, 599 F. Supp. 79
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); Kaplan v. 442 Coop. Bldg. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1992); Honorable v.
Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
114. See, e.g., Clifton Terrace Assoc. v. United Technologies Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 720
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (recognizing that FHA addresses habitability of premises); Bet-
sey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984) (ruling that plain-
tiffs had made out a prima facie case of harassment under the FHA, where such
harassment occurred post-acquisition); Whisby-Myers v. Kiekenapp, 293 F. Supp.
2d 845, 851-52 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting claim that FHA bars only discrimina-
tion in connection with a real estate transaction); Marthon v. Maple Grove
Condo. Ass'n, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1052 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (refusing to dismiss
plaintiffs post-acquisition disability harassment claim under the FHA).
115. United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (D. Neb. 2004). See also Schroe-
der v. Bertolo, 879 F. Supp. 173, 176-77 (D.P.R. 1995) (explaining that an owner's
"housing rights did not terminate" once she purchased her condominium, but that
under the FHA, she had "the continuing right to quiet enjoyment and use" of her
dwelling).
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or rental transaction."X6 Most recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals took the position that the FHA does not protect against post-
acquisition harassment. In Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of
Dearborn Park Ass'n,117 the Seventh Circuit concluded that the FHA
"contains no hint in either its language or its legislative history of a
concern with anything but access to housing.""18 In the court's opin-
ion, because Congress was concerned with minority exclusion from de-
sirable neighborhoods when it passed fair housing legislation in 1968,
"the problem of how they were treated when they were included, that
is, when they were allowed to own or rent homes in such areas, was
not at the forefront of congressional thinking.""l 9 Although the
soundness of the Halprin court's legal reasoning has been questioned
by both judges' 20 and commentators,121 its arguments may not be
wholly without merit.
Most strikingly, as discussed earlier, the FHA does not expressly
prohibit "harassment." Instead, courts that have found post-acquisi-
tion harassment protection in the FHA have relied on statutory provi-
sions that make it unlawful under § 3604(a) "[t]o refuse to sell or rent
... or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling."'12 2 Others
have relied on § 3604(b), which prohibits discrimination "against any
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental."'12 3 Al-
though these statutory provisions explicitly address the right of acqui-
sition, expanding it to protect occupancy requires a more subtle
interpretationX24-one rejected by the Halprin court and others.
116. See, e.g., Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743
F.2d 1207, 1210-11 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that challenged acts under
§ 3604(a) must "lead to discriminatory effects on the availability of housing");
Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. 05-3197, 2005 WL
2669480 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005) (dismissing plaintiffs' claim under the FHA
where she did not allege interference in the acquisition of her residence); King v.
Metcalf 56 Homes Ass'n, No. 04-2192, 2004 WL 2538379, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 8,
2004) (granting summary judgment against plaintiffs who claimed racial harass-
ment and noting that plaintiffs had not alleged any discrimination in the original
acquisition of housing); Gourlay, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1234 (ruling against plaintiff
in her FHA harassment claims because defendants' alleged conduct did not pre-
clude plaintiffs ownership of a home).
117. 388 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 2004).
118. Id. at 329 (emphasis in original).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 973-80 (disagreeing with both the reasoning
and conclusions of the Seventh Circuit in Halprin).
121. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occu-
pants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 18-33 (2008);
Aric Short, Post-Acquisition Harassment and the Scope of the Fair Housing Act,
58 ALA. L. REV. 203 (2006).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000).
123. Id. at § 3604(b).
124. Several courts have concluded, in varying contexts, that § 3604 protects occu-
pancy of housing. See, e.g., Clifton Terrace Assoc. v. United Technologies Corp.,
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Even the FHA's clearest harassment-related language in § 3617-
which makes it "unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere
with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of' a fair housing
right125-is poorly drafted and ambiguous. In particular, a number of
courts have interpreted this language narrowly to provide plaintiffs a
harassment claim only when they also allege discrimination in the ac-
quisition of housing.126 Such interpretations clearly exclude plaintiffs
whose only injury is alleged harassment after their occupation began.
In this context, it is noteworthy that an administrative rule promul-
gated by HUD to implement the FHA attempts to clarify the statute's
application to claims of unlawful disturbance of possession by explic-
itly prohibiting "[t]hreatening, intimidating or interfering with per-
sons in their enjoyment of a dwelling."127 Whether or not HUD's rule
impermissibly expands the scope of the FHA beyond what Congress
intended, 128 the FHA clearly omits similarly explicit post-acquisition
protection.
Advocates of occupancy protection also find little clear support in
the FHA's legislative history. In particular, the draft legislation was
almost always framed as an "open housing" law-one that would
guarantee non-discriminatory access to housing and, as a result, help
alleviate racial segregation in American neighborhoods. 129 Through-
929 F.2d 714, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (ruling that § 3604(b) protects habitability);
Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984) (recognizing
claim of harassment under § 3604); Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 976 (concluding that
§ 3604 protects existing occupants against sexual harassment); Whisby-Myers v.
Kiekenapp, 293 F. Supp. 2d 845, 851-52 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting argument that
§ 3604 protects only against discrimination in the acquisition of housing).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000).
126. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d
327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004) (determining that because plaintiffs did not allege any
interference with their acquisition of housing, their claims under § 3617 failed);
Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 834 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that § 3617 "pro-
hibits the interference with the exercise of Fair Housing rights only as enumer-
ated" in [§§ 3603-3606], which define the substantive violations of the Act");
Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(concluding that "plaintiffs, once having secured their housing, have no right
under the FHA to be free from interference with the peaceful enjoyment of their
home by one not associated with its sale or rental").
127. 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (2007) (emphasis added).
128. See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330 (noting that this "regulation may stray too far from
section 3617 ... to be valid").
129. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2144, and S. 2280
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong. 6 (1967) (statement of Ramsey Clark, Att'y Gen. of the
United States) (explaining that the FHA would provide "open housing, housing
unrestricted. It will eliminate widespread forced housing where racial minorities
are barred from residential areas and confined to the ghetto and other segregated
areas"); REP. OF THE NAT'L ADvIsORY COMM'N ON CIVL DISORDERS 28 (1968) (rec-
ommending that Congress pass a "comprehensive and enforceable federal open
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out the course of numerous committee, subcommittee, and floor de-
bates from 1966 to 1968, members of Congress, the executive branch,
and interested individuals repeatedly discussed the need to protect
the housing transaction.130 As a result, what emerges from the legis-
lative record is an overwhelming focus on access issues, framed as con-
cerns about racial segregation and discriminatory exclusions from
housingl 3 1 and the need to open a housing market "virtually closed" to
minorities. 13 2 In comparison to this heavy access focus in the legisla-
tive record, 1 33 the lack of any meaningful discussion of protected occu-
pancy is striking. Although concern was expressed about the social
and psychological problems stemming from racial segregation, those
problems were usually discussed in the context of discriminatory ex-
clusions from housing, not housing harassment.134
housing law" to help address the growing problems of racial segregation and re-
sulting violence plaguing the nation).
130. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2144, and S. 2280
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong. 29 (1967) (statement of Robert C. Weaver, Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development) ("This is a comprehensive proposal which
would prohibit discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of housing, includ-
ing discriminatory advertising and discrimination in representations made as to
the availability of housing."); 114 CONG. REc. 2279 (1968) (statement of Sen.
Brooke) ("Millions of Americans have been denied fair access to decent housing
because of their race or color. If we perceive this reality, on what possible
grounds can we delay the evident remedy?").
131. H.R. REP. No. 89-1678, at 59 (1966) (Minority Views of the Hon. Basil L. Whit-
ener) (stating that the bill was proposed to "provide adequate and integrated
housing for minority groups"); Fair Housing Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1358, S.
2144, and S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 128 (1967) (statement of Rev. Rob-
ert F. Drinan, S.J., Dean, Boston College Law School) (explaining that "the guar-
antee of integrated housing for Negroes is the one great commitment which
Congress has still refused to make").
132. H.R. REP. No. 1678, at 19 (1966) (Additional Views of Hon. William M. McCulloch
and Hon. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.).
133. The FHA's access focus began with President Johnson's letter introducing fair
housing legislation in 1966. In that letter, he urged Congress to declare as a
national policy the eradication of "racial discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing." Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within
the Jurisdiction of the United States: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1049 (1966) (letter from Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States).
134. As explained by Senator Mondale, "[t]he real evil in the ghetto effects is the rejec-
tion and humiliation of human beings. [A] sense of humiliation goes all through
the ghetto." 114 CONG. REC. 2281 (1968) (testimony of Sen. Mondale) (citation
omitted). But in the senator's opinion, fair housing legislation would have "great
practical psychological significance to the Negro who ... remains trapped in the
ghetto for a lifetime." Id. at 3421.
2008] SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HOUSING
Against this backdrop of statutory language and legislative his-
tory, and fueled by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Halprin,13 5 a
number of courts have recently adopted a narrow reading of the FHA's
scope to exclude post-acquisition protection. In Lawrence v. Court-
yards at Deerwood Ass'n, Inc.,136 for example, the district court
granted defendants' summary judgment motion where plaintiffs al-
leged that a racially hostile housing environment had been created by
the management association. In ruling against the plaintiffs, the
court observed that "[a]s the statutory language makes clear ... sec-
tion 3604 applies only to discrimination related to the acquisition or
sale and rental of housing."13 7 A more recent decision opined that "[a]
majority of courts considering the issue have found that Section
3604(b) is limited to discrimination in provision of services as they are
connected to the acquisition or sale and rental of housing."138 Another
district court in Florida has concluded that "Section 3604(a) prevents
discriminatory conduct that directly deprives protected persons from
housing opportunities" 139 and that "Section 3604(b) only prohibits the
discriminatory provision of services and facilities in connection with a
sale of a dwelling."140 Whatever the merits of these positions,' 4 ' a
growing body of case law' 4 2 is whittling away at the FHA's potential,
possibly leaving victims of housing harassment without a federal
claim.
135. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.2d
327 (7th Cir. 2004); Walton v. Claybridge Homeowners Ass'n, No. 06-1914, 2006
WL 2243902, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2006) (explaining that in Halprin "we held
that [§ 3617] literally provided a cause of action only for plaintiffs who complain
about discrimination in acquiring, rather than simply enjoying, property").
136. 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1136-39 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
137. Id. at 1142. Rejecting the plaintiffs' claims under § 3617, the Lawrence court
ruled that to violate § 3617 in the absence of some other FHA claim-such as an
interference with access claim under § 3604-"the discriminatory conduct must
be pervasive and severe enough to be considered as threatening or violent." Id. at
1145.
138. Savanna Club Worship Serv., Inc. v. Savanna Club Homeowners' Ass'n., 456 F.
Supp. 2d 1223, 1227-28 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (citations omitted).
139. Gourlay v. Forest lake Estates Civic Ass'n of Port Richey, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222,
1230 n.10 (M.D. Fla. 2003). The district court's summary judgment decision in
the Gourlay litigation was withdrawn by stipulation of the parties after they
reached settlement. See Gourlay v. Forest Lake Estates Civic Ass'n of Port
Richey, No. 8:02CV1955T30TGW, 2003 WL 22149660 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2003).
140. Gourlay, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.
141. As discussed in depth elsewhere, these narrow interpretations of the FHA are
open to considerable criticism. See United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D.
Neb. 2004); Oliveri, supra note 121; Short, supra note 121.
142. See supra note 116.
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B. Legal Standard for Hostile Housing Environment Claims
Assuming that the FHA continues to be interpreted and applied by
most courts as protecting not simply the acquisition but also subse-
quent occupation of property, other problems exist in the context of
sexual harassment. Two such problems can be traced to the heavy
reliance that federal courts place on doctrines developed under Title
VII: use of a "reasonable person" standard to evaluate allegedly
harassing conduct and the failure of courts to appreciate the psycho-
logical importance of the locus of harassment, the home.
1. Establishing the Proper Perspective
Where the perpetrator does not condition housing or housing-re-
lated services on sexual favors, the tenant's harassment claim exists
in the current legal framework as one based on a hostile housing envi-
ronment: one that "unreasonably interferes with use and enjoyment of
the premises."143 The perspective adopted by courts to evaluate
whether use and enjoyment have been unreasonably interfered with is
a critical component of this inquiry. However, because neither the
FHA nor current HUD rules establish standards for evaluating alleg-
edly harassing behavior, many federal courts considering housing
claims have adopted the general perspective used under Title VII.144
Although federal courts do not agree on the proper perspective to
use in evaluating Title VII hostile work environment claims,145 most
courts ask whether a reasonable person would find the work environ-
ment burdensome as a result of the offending conduct.146 This ap-
proach may be advantageous for a number of reasons. In particular, it
establishes a neutral standard that can be applied regardless of the
specific qualities, characteristics, or background of the victim or per-
petrator.14 7 This allows for the development of a relatively uniform
standard of conduct over time, which helps establish predictability for
143. Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 109-115
and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996); Neudecker v.
Boisclair Corp, No. Civ. 02-4099JNEJGL, 2005 WL 1607409, at *4 (D. Minn. July
7, 2005); Rich v. Lubin, No. 02 Civ. 6786(TPG), 2004 WL 1124662, at *4 (S.D.N.Y
May 20, 2004); see also Zalesne, supra note 39, at 877.
145. See William Douglas Woody, Wayne Viney, Paul A. Bell & Nora L. Bensko, Sex-
ual Harassment: The "Reasonable Person" vs "Reasonable Woman" Standards
Have Not Been Resolved, 78 PSYCHOL. REP. 329, 329-30 (1996) (summarizing ar-
guments advocating and opposing adoption of a reasonable woman standard in
the Title VII context).
146. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993); Waltman v. Int'l
Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 1989); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805
F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986). See also Emily Epstein, Federal Sexual Harass-
ment and the "Reasonable Woman" Standard, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 377 (2004).
147. See Patricia Linenberger, What Behavior Constitutes Sexual Harassment?, 34
LAB. L.J. 238, 246 (1983).
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all involved.148 The reasonable person standard also avoids difficult
questions about how particular aspects of the victim or perpetrator-
such as their race, education level, or financial status-affect the
analysis.
However, these advantages having to do with certainty and pre-
dictability do not outweigh the limitations of the reasonable person
standard. In particular, the standard "tends to be male-biased and
tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women."149 In this
way, the reasonable person standard "fails to reflect women's percep-
tions of what constitutes sexual harassment."150 Because victims of
residential sexual harassment are almost always female, their per-
spective, rather than a "reasonable person," should be the focus. Such
a victim-oriented standard would acknowledge general gender-based
differences in what men and women consider harassing conduct.151
Responding to such concerns, a few courts have adopted a "reasonable
woman" standard in housing harassment cases. 152 HUD's 2000 draft
rules on housing harassment followed this general lead, focusing on
how the alleged harassment would have affected a reasonable tenant
148. See Robert Rosenthal, Comment, Landlord Sexual Harassment: A Federal Rem-
edy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 589, 594 (1992); Zalesne, supra note 39 at 870.
149. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991). A number of commen-
tators have more exhaustively evaluated the reasonable person standard in har-
assment law generally. See, e.g., Eileen M. Blackwood, The Reasonable Woman
in Sexual Harassment Law and the Case for Subjectivity, 16 VT. L. REV. 1005
(1992); Deborah B. Goldberg, The Road to Equality: The Application of the Rea-
sonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 2 CADOZO WOMEN'S L.J.
195 (1995); Carol Sanger, The Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1411 (1992).
150. See Zalesne, supra note 144 at 877; see also, Adams supra note 27, at 44-51.
151. Recent studies have consistently found that men and women perceive potentially
sexually harassing conduct differently. In particular, women are more likely
than men to describe conduct as harassing and to report a higher frequency of
sexual harassment. See, e.g., Brenda L. Russell & Kristin Y. Trigg, Tolerance of
Sexual Harassment: An Examination of Gender Differences, Ambivalent Sexism,
Social Dominance, and Gender Roles, 50 SEx ROLES 565 (2004) (concluding that
although women are significantly less tolerant than men of potentially sexually
harassing behavior, that variance may be traceable to ambivalent sexism and
hostility toward women); Eliza G.C. Collins & Timothy B. Blodgett, Sexual Har-
assment... Some See It... Some Won't, HAxv. Bus. REv., Mar.-April 1981, at 76
(determining that although men and women generally agree on how to define
sexual harassment, women reported that harassing conduct occurs more
frequently).
152. See, e.g., Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1397-98 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Shel-
lhammer v. Lewallen, 770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985). Similarly, some courts in the
Title VII context have adopted or at least recognized the potential benefits of a
"reasonable woman" standard. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th
Cir. 1991) (concluding that "a gender-conscious examination of sexual harass-
ment enables women to participate in the workplace on an equal footing with
men"). See generally, Epstein, supra note 146.
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in the victim's position.153 Although there are drawbacks associated
with a standard that considers the subjective viewpoint of the vic-
tim,154 such an approach likely results in greater protection against
harassing conduct. However, to the extent that the reasonable person
standard remains the majority approach in this area, the FHA cannot
be seen as fully protecting victims of sexual harassment.
2. Ignoring the Importance of Locus
A related problem under current FHA doctrine flows from courts'
heavy reliance on law developed under Title VII. In particular, such
reliance may obscure the important characteristics of the locus of har-
assment, the home, as well as its psychological meaning and value to
the victim.
DiCenso v. Cisneros,15 5 decided by the Seventh Circuit in 1996,
provides one example of how courts can overlook the subjective impor-
tance of the home environment. In that case, when DiCenso, the de-
fendant, visited the apartment of the eighteen-year-old plaintiff,
Brown, to collect rent, he stood in her doorway and "began caressing
her arm and back."156 He then told her that if she could not pay the
rent, she could "take care of it in other ways."157 After Brown re-
sponded by slamming the door in DiCenso's face, he stood outside her
doorway calling Brown a "bitch" and a "whore."158
In evaluating the plaintiffs sexual harassment claims, the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning tracked its approach under Title VII, namely that
"isolated and innocuous incidents do not support a finding of sexual
harassment."159 As explained by the court, "the problem with Brown's
complaint is that although DiCenso may have harassed her, he did so
153. See Fair Housing Act Standards Governing Sexual Harassment Cases, 65 Fed.
Reg. 67,666, 67,666-67 (Nov. 13, 2000). The draft rules explain that "[a] person
creates a hostile environment when that person's unwelcome conduct is suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive that it results in the creation of an environment that a
reasonable person in the aggrieved person's position would find intimidating,
hostile, offensive, or otherwise significantly less desirable." Id. at 67,666. The
rules go on to clarify that "[tlhe perspective of a reasonable person in the ag-
grieved person's position is that of an ordinary person in like circumstances." Id.
at 67,667.
154. In particular, the "reasonable woman" standard risks essentializing women and
may help create a subjective and unpredictable standard for housing harassment.
See Zalesne, supra note 144 at 876.
155. 96 F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 1996).
156. Id. at 1006.
157. Id.
158. Id. In addition to these events, Brown's complaint alleged additional incidents of
harassment by DiCenso, as well as unauthorized entries by him into Brown's
home. Id. at 1006 n.1. However, these additional facts were not considered by
the district court because the administrative law judge did not find DiCenso re-
sponsible for them. Id.
159. Id. at 1008.
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only once. Moreover, Brown's conduct, while clearly unwelcome, was
much less offensive than other incidents which have not violated Title
VII."160 In particular, the defendant did not touch "an intimate body
part" of the plaintiff and did not threaten her with physical harm.16 1
While "tihere is no question that Brown found DiCenso's remarks to
be subjectively unpleasant ... this alone did not create an objectively
hostile environment."16 2
There are at least two striking problems with the court's reason-
ing. First, a problem addressed more broadly in the prior subsection,
is the court's decision to view the offending conduct through an "objec-
tive" lens. This resulted in a finding of no liability against DiCenso,
despite the fact that the court explicitly recognized subjective harm to
Brown. The court's conclusion that one incident of harassment would
not be actionable under the FHA is especially troubling given that the
only empirical study of residential sexual harassment found 35% of
such abuse to have lasted only one day.16 3 Second, in determining
whether a "hostile environment" had been created by DiCenso's con-
duct, the court made no attempt to evaluate the importance of where
DiCenso harassed Brown. As discussed earlier,164 the home is a
uniquely personal and intimate environment. It is a place of refuge
and protection for the renter and her family, where security normally
exists against the outside world. Perhaps most importantly, it is a
location of privacy where occupants have the reasonable expectation
that they may and can exclude anyone they choose.16 5 In these ways,
it is distinctly different than a traditional work environment, which is
open and public. At work, there is usually less privacy and intimacy,
and the regular interaction of employees may allow victims some abili-
ties to distance or shield themselves from harassing co-workers or su-
pervisors. 16 6 Such a buffer zone is difficult, if not impossible, to create
in the landlord-tenant context, where the victim's abuser is the same
person she must interact with regularly to pay rent and report main-
160. Id. at 1008-09.
161. Id. at 1009.
162. Id.
163. See Cahan, supra note 27, at 1073.
164. See supra subsection II.A and accompanying notes.
165. In another context, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
home: the "[s]anctity of the home is no greater than sanctity of the person."
Agnello v. United Sates, 269 U.S. 20, 25 (1925) (concluding that the Fourth
Amendment was violated by a warrantless search).
166. See Kathleen Butler, Sexual Harassment in Rental Housing, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV.
175, 204 (1989) (concluding that sexual harassment in the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship "may create a stronger and more real sense of personal danger" than
harassment in the employer-employee context); Roos, supra note 27, at 1145 (ex-
plaining that, unlike the employment context, a tenant victimized by her land-
lord "is often expected to direct her complaint to close associates of the harasser
... or even the harasser himself").
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tenance problems. This fundamental distinction between work and
home-in particular, the different expectations of privacy and protec-
tion that reasonably exist in each location-should form a part of
courts' analyses in sexual harassment cases. Specifically, heightened
protection for the victim of sexual harassment in the home is
appropriate. 16 7
Under this approach, it should be irrelevant that DiCenso's con-
duct was "much less offensive than other incidents which have not vio-
lated Title VII."168 What should be relevant, instead, is how
DiCenso's conduct-within the environment in which it occurredl 69 -
affected Brown. From this perspective, DiCenso's behavior appears
quite damaging. On Brown's doorstep, DiCenso initiated uninvited
physical contact, offered to exchange rent for sex, and verbally as-
saulted Brown when she rejected his advances. Beyond the trauma of
these incidents, Brown likely feared future sexual advances from
DiCenso, given his unique ability to access her dwelling at any time
and the likelihood that, as her landlord, DiCenso would have reason to
call and visit her again.170 In this way, DiCenso's harassing conduct
was not only damaging by itself; it also stripped away the protective
shield of Brown's home, isolating her and deepening her injury.
Where courts fail to take into consideration in their FHA analyses the
psychological and emotional aspects of abuse inflicted within the home
environment, they risk underprotecting victims. 171
167. See Lindemyer, supra note 23, at 368 (noting that "Ithe expectation of both
safety and privacy in one's home is justifiably greater than that in the workplace,
and thus a higher standard of conduct is warranted"); Zaslene, supra note 144, at
886-88 (arguing that the "fundamental differences" between harassment in the
home and on the job make application of the same legal standard in both contexts
'a mistake").
168. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008-09.
169. See Adams, supra note 27, at 54-55 (citing the DiCenso case as one example of a
decontextualized analysis of residential sexual harassment).
170. See Lindemyer, supra note 23, at 376 (explaining that residential sexual harass-
ment also brings with it the "omnipresent threat of future, more egregious harm
due to the fact that the landlord has unrestrained access to the tenants'
apartment").
171. Other courts have apparently failed to recognize the subjective value of the home
as part of their sexual harassment analyses. In Cavalieri-Conway v. L. But-
terman & Associates, for example, the district court granted defendants' sum-
mary judgment motion where the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment
perpetrated by her landlord. 992 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Ill. 1998). In particular, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant used sexually graphic and crude language
around her, demanded that she remain chaste in exchange for undertaking re-
pairs on her property, and kept her under surveillance. Id. at 1008. In rejecting
her claims, the court concluded that the landlord's language was "not sufficiently
egregious to constitute [sexual] harassment," that the landlord used threatening
language "on only two occasions way back in 1992," and that his abusive com-
ments were "not coupled with any threat of physical harm." Id. In making these
conclusions, the court simply imported into its analysis the Title VII standard
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IV. THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST
RESIDENTIAL SEXUAL HARASSMENT
With sexual harassment of tenants being a serious problem in soci-
ety and one that is likely growing worse given the declining supply of
low income housing, potential shortcomings in the traditional avenue
for redress are even more problematic. However, a variety of possible
obvious solutions exist. For example, HUD could promulgate explicit
rules detailing the FHA's post-acquisition protection, including its
coverage of sexual harassment. The draft rules prepared and circu-
lated by HUD in 2000, which included standards for quid pro quo and
hostile housing environment claims, provided a good starting point for
such an effort.172 Of course, even the most comprehensive rules in
this context would be ineffectual if they exceed the scope of the FHA
itself-a point driven home by the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Halprin.173
Another way to address any shortcomings in existing occupancy
protection would be to amend the FHA to unequivocally bring post-
acquisition coverage within the statute. Modifying the FHA's lan-
guage, however, would surely generate a contentious fight among in-
terest groups seeking to define with specificity the exact contours of
the statute. 174 Congress would also run the risk in amending the
FHA of implicitly undermining the statutory support for past deci-
sions recognizing post-acquisition protection. An alternative remedy
would be to do nothing to the law itself, but simply focus on advocacy:
to argue that existing statutory law adequately protects occupants
from housing harassment and that judicial opinions to the contrary-
such as Halprin-have little statutory, historical, or policy support.
In addition to these more traditional and obvious solutions,17 5 the
Thirteenth Amendment exists as a potential tool to protect tenants
and never considered the psychological importance of the location of the harass-
ment. Id. at 1007-08.
172. See Fair Housing Act Standards Governing Sexual Harassment Cases, 65 Fed.
Reg. 67,666-01 (Nov. 13, 2000).
173. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 330
(7th Cir. 2004) (opining that the relevant HUD regulation, which prohibited
"[t]hreatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a
dwelling" may "stray too far from section 3617 ... to be valid").
174. Given the heated disagreements that developed during prior attempts to amend
the FHA, it is not unreasonable to anticipate similar debates if Congress consid-
ers explicitly adding post-acquisition protection to the FHA. See, e.g., Peter W.
Salsich, Jr., Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long History of So-
cioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 459, 486 (2007)
(describing the "years of contentious debate" that preceded amendment of the
FHA in 1988 to include familial status and disability protection).
175. Plaintiffs might also rely on state law claims, such as the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. See Haddad v. Gonzales, 576 N.E.2d 658 (Mass. 1991)
(awarding a victim of residential sexual harassment damages under a deceptive
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against sexual harassment in housing. Without question, the Thir-
teenth Amendment argument explored in this section is nontradi-
tional. It has not been addressed in reported federal decisions,
suggesting that it may not have been advanced very often (if ever) in
housing harassment litigation. As a consequence, some degree of re-
sistance to this argument is expected, if for no other reason than it
challenges the status quo.
My call for a robust interpretation and modern application of the
Thirteenth Amendment is not without precedent. A rediscovery of the
Thirteenth Amendment served as the foundation for the civil rights
campaign of the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Section fol-
lowing World War 11,176 and it has provided the springboard for vari-
ous scholarly arguments seeking innovative ways to address a wide
range of modern legal problems.17 7 Below I explore the Amendment's
text, drafting history, and social context to evaluate its applicability to
claims of sexual harassment in housing.17s
trade practices statute based on a theory of intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Susan Etta Keller, Does the Roof Have to Cave In? The Landlord/Ten-
ant Power Relationship and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 9
CARDOZO L. REV. 1663 (1988).
176. See Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil
Rights, 50 DuKE L. J. 1609, 1659 (2000-2001) (explaining that the Section also
"began to treat not only the legal structures that facilitated involuntary servi-
tude, but also the social and economic ones, as potentially coming within the
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment").
177. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thir-
teenth Amendment Approach to Deshaney, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1359 (1991-1992);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992-1993); Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thir-
teenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403 (1993); Douglas Colbert, Liberating the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1995); Jennifer L. Conn, Sexual
Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Response, 28 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS.
519 (1994-1995); Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense
of the Violence Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1097 (1997-1998); Joyce E.
McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 207 (1991-1992); Larry J. Pitt-
man, A Thirteenth Amendment Challenge to Both Racial Disparities in Medical
Treatments and Improper Physicians' Informed Consent Disclosures, 48 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 131 (2003-2004); Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols:
A Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539 (2002).
178. The Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of all "badges and incidents of slavery"
potentially provides further protection in this context. Although a full discussion
of badges and incidents is beyond the scope of this Article, such an argument
would need to demonstrate that the Amendment directly prohibits remnants of
the chattel slavery system and that at least some cases of sexual harassment in
housing reasonably qualify as badges or incidents of that system. See generally,
William M. Carter, Jr., Race Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the
Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1311 (2007).
As to the first question, the debates surrounding congressional consideration
of the Thirteenth Amendment suggest that many congressmen expected the pro-
posed Amendment to both unshackle slavery's bonds and "directRly] ban.., many
[Vol. 86:838
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A. The Legal Basis of Involuntary Servitude
In its first section, the Thirteenth Amendment decrees that
"[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States . ... "179 This broad language is noteworthy
of the evils radiating out from the system of slavery." Jacobus tenBroek, Thir-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Ab-
olition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REV. 171, 180 (1951); see
Douglas Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1995). Although the Supreme Court hailed the Thirteenth Amendment
as a "grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom of all [people],"
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872), the Court has never fully defined
the Amendment's scope or articulated whether the Amendment has a self-execut-
ing force beyond abolishing slavery. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (refusing to consider whether "the Amendment itself did any
more than [abolish slavery]-a question not involved in this case").
Assuming that the Thirteenth Amendment directly prohibits vestiges of the
chattel slavery system, the second question is whether residential sexual harass-
ment reasonably constitutes such a burden. In describing badges and incidents
of slavery, the Court has called them the "vestiges and incidents of a society half
slave and half free" that limit the "fundamental rights [that] are the essence of
civil freedom." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883). In evaluating whether
specific harms constitute badges and incidents, the Court has looked generally at
the similarity between the alleged injuries and the burdens actually suffered
under slavery. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 21. As discussed infra in
Section IV.A.3, physical subjugation, in general, and sexual harassment, in par-
ticular, were common aspects of American slavery. Indeed, compelling similari-
ties between sexual harassment during slavery and sexual harassment
perpetrated by landlords against tenants suggest that the latter might properly
be labeled a badge or incident of slavery.
First, the players are similar. In both settings, a man sexually preys on a
female. The victims of sexual harassment perpetrated by the master during slav-
ery were all obviously black. Today, renters who suffer sexual harassment at the
hands of their landlords are overwhelmingly women of color, and often African
American. E.g., Zhu v. Countrywide Realty Co., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D.
Kan. 2001); Maze v. Krueger, HUDALJ 05-93-0196-1, 1996 WL 418886
(HUDAIA June 7, 1996). Second, powerlessness is at the root of both scenarios.
For slaves, their powerlessness was imposed by the legal system and the physical
force of their owners. Masters also used slave children against the females,
knowing that slaves were reluctant to flee abusive owners because of their desire
to remain with and protect their children. The slave's overall powerlessness
translated into increased dependency on the slave master, which, in turn, fed the
slave's powerlessness. Similarly, although victims of residential sexual harass-
ment today are obviously not owned by their landlords, they often lack any realis-
tic ability to escape the abusive setting because of their poverty. Furthermore,
victims frequently feel pressured to remain in abusive settings because of their
desire to keep a roof over their children's heads. See, e.g., Krueger v. Cuomo, 115
F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1997); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993); Zhu v. Fed.
Hous. Fin. Bd., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Kan. 2005). As a result, today's sexually
harassed tenant is isolated, manipulable, and largely powerless-similar in fun-
damental ways to the female slave sexually abused by her master.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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for a number of reasons. First, at least in its abolition of slavery and
involuntary servitude, the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing,
requiring no congressional enactment to become enforceable by pri-
vate citizens in court.1 8 0 Second, although it was drafted, debated,
passed, and ratified against the backdrop of African chattel slavery,
the Amendment's language clearly extends beyond that institution to
prohibit both "slavery" and "involuntary servitude" in general.'18 In
other words, no person, regardless of race, gender, or other personal
characteristic, may suffer in slavery or involuntary servitude. Third,
and in contrast to most constitutional mandates, private conduct-
and not simply governmental conduct-can violate the Thirteenth
Amendment.182 For these reasons, the Amendment is potentially
quite powerful as a legal tool today.
To begin the analysis of whether the Thirteenth Amendment may
have application in the housing context, a logical starting point is the
relevant legal standard: where did the phrase "involuntary servitude"
come from and what does it mean? The origin of the phrase is rela-
tively easy to trace. "Involuntary servitude" was included as part of
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787: "There shall be neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the pun-
ishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed."' 8 3  From there, prohibitions against both slavery and
180. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20 ("This Amendment .. .is undoubtedly self-
executing without any ancillary legislation.... Still, legislation may be necessary
and proper to meet all the various cases and circumstances to be affected by it,
and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit.").
181. See, e.g., Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. at 69 ("The word servitude is of larger
meaning than slavery, as the latter is popularly understood in this country, and
the obvious purpose was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery.");
Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916) ("[Tlhe term involuntary servitude was
intended to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which
in practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable results."); United
States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1984) (observing that the Thir-
teenth Amendment is not "limited to the classic form of slavery" and applies "to
contemporary as well as to historic forms of involuntary servitude").
182. This is, of course, a striking and fundamental difference between the Thirteenth
Amendment and the other Reconstruction amendments. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.").
183. Northwest Ordinance, Art. VI, 32 J. OF CONTINENTAL CONGREss 343 (1787). See
United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 484 (2d Cir. 1964); Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219, 240 (1911) (observing that the Thirteenth Amendment gave the
"historic words" of the Northwest Ordinance "unrestricted application within the
United States and all places subject to their jurisdiction"); ALEXANDER TSESIS,
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involuntary servitude were inserted into the constitutions of states
subject to the Ordinance.1S4 The phrase was also included in the Mis-
souri Compromise of 1820 and in the constitutions of the states gov-
erned by the Compromise.18 5 In 1862, Congress passed laws banning
both slavery and involuntary servitude in the District of Columbia
and the territories.' 8 6 With this widespread acceptance of the phrase
"involuntary servitude," 8 7 it was, according to one federal court, "nat-
ural that these historic words should be used in the Thirteenth
Amendment."188
Though the origins of the phrase are relatively clear, its meaning
may not be. In the words of Justice O'Connor, "[w]hile the general
spirit of the phrase 'involuntary servitude' is easily comprehended, the
exact range of conditions it prohibits is harder to define."18 9 Further-
more, as courts have struggled with the meaning of "involuntary ser-
vitude," they have usually focused their inquiry on whether a person's
condition is "involuntary" under the Thirteenth Amendment, not
whether it constitutes "servitude."190 The following sections seek a
more complete understanding of "involuntary servitude," and to that
end, explore the requirement of involuntariness and what constitutes
servitude for purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment. 19 1
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 38 (New York University
Press 2004) (describing the Northwest Ordinance as "the foundation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment").
184. See Shackney, 333 F.2d at 484. The phrase was also part of the 1864 Wilmot
Proviso, which had application to the land won from Mexico during the Mexican-
American War. See Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 450 n.69 (1989-1990) (citation omitted).
185. See Shackney, 333 F.2d at 484.
186. See Act of Apr. 16, 1862, ch. 54 § 1, 12 Stat. 376 (1862) (District of Columbia); Act
of June 19, 1862, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432 (1862) (territories); see also Catherine M.
Page, United States v. Kozminski" Involuntary Servitude - A Standard at Last,
20 U. TOL. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1988-1989).
187. Other instances of the use of "involuntary servitude" exist during this general
timeframe. See, e.g., Gary K. Wolinetz, New Jersey Slavery and the Law, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 2227, 2257 (1998) (explaining that in 1847, the New Jersey leg-
islature adopted a resolution expressing its sentiment that slavery or involuntary
servitude should be excluded from any territory admitted into the union).
188. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 484.
189. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988).
190. See McConnell, supra note 177, at 221.
191. Although courts have not generally focused on the contours of "servitude" under
the Thirteenth Amendment, relevant jury instructions have made clear that the
words "involuntary" and "servitude" are relevant and important, both as separate
words and as a phrase in this context. See, e.g., Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 936-37
(reprinting the jury instruction provided by the trial court in that case, which
explicitly states that "Involuntary servitude consists of two terms," and then pro-
vides a definition of each, followed by more generalized definitions and examples
of "involuntary servitude").
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1. Involuntariness Under the Thirteenth Amendment
From a textual perspective, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits
all servitude that is "involuntary." The word "involuntary" appears
relatively straightforward and simply means that an action is "done
contrary to or without choice" or is "not subject to control of the
will."192 The Thirteenth Amendment includes no limitation or qualifi-
cation. For example, it does not require that involuntariness be
brought about in a certain way or through certain means, such as
through threatened or actual use of physical violence. Thought of a
different way, the Amendment contains no exclusions for involuntari-
ness created through non-violent means, such as economic or psycho-
logical coercion. 19 3 Instead, the Thirteenth Amendment asks only
whether servitude is involuntary, not how or by what means the con-
dition of involuntariness was established.
Despite this apparent textual clarity, federal courts before 1988
could not agree on exactly what involuntariness meant in the context
of the Thirteenth Amendment. Early cases involving claims of invol-
untary servitude drew a connection to something like African chattel
slavery 194 but recognized the Thirteenth Amendment's application to
cases of forced wage labor or labor to pay off existing debt.195 How-
ever, as federal courts evaluated further claims of involuntary servi-
tude brought under the Thirteenth Amendment and its implementing
statutes, 19 6 they began to consider not simply whether a person's ser-
192. Merriam-Webster Online, http://mwl.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
involuntary.
193. This textualist argument is not without its judicial adherents. E.g., Shackney,
333 F.2d at 487 (Dimock, J., concurring) (defining the "plain and intended mean-
ing of 'involuntary' as dealing only with the will of the servitor," focusing on
"whether [the servitor] has been rendered incapable of making a rational choice,
and not the question of what were the means by which the servitude was
imposed").
194. See, e.g., Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897) (explaining that "invol-
untary servitude" in the Thirteenth Amendment "intended to cover the system of
Mexican peonage and the Chinese coolie trade, the practical operation of which
might have been a revival of the institution of [African chattel] slavery under a
different and less offensive name"); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872)
(determining that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits "all shades and condi-
tions of African slavery").
195. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944) (striking down state law imposing
criminal sanctions on debtors who refused to perform labor after receiving ad-
vance payments); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914) (determining
that compelling services by the fear of criminal prosecution violates the rights
protected by the Thirteenth Amendment); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207
(1905) (concluding that peonage, where the debtor is required to work to pay off
his debt, constitutes involuntary servitude); see generally, Kozminski, 487 U.S.
931, 942-43.
196. Much of the litigation over the concept of involuntary servitude and discussed in
this Article arises out of the federal statutes passed to criminally enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2000) (criminalizing "knowingly
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vitude was involuntary or coerced, but also how the person's servitude
became involuntary. By 1988, when it considered United States v.
Kozminski, the Supreme Court faced a circuit split on this issue.
On one side of the debate was the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in its 1964 decision, United States v. Shackney.' 9 7 In that case, the
court reviewed the conviction of Shackney, who was accused of holding
two Mexican families in a contractual labor relationship in violation of
federal laws prohibiting involuntary servitude and peonage. 198 Re-
jecting the government's contention that involuntary servitude "in ef-
fect.., is equivalent to... knowingly and willfully hold [ing] to service
by duress,"199 the court adopted a narrow construction of "involuntary
servitude." Relying on the basic assumption that "'involuntary servi-
tude' was considered to be something 'akin to African slavery,'"200 the
court concluded that involuntary servitude meant that "[tihere must
be 'law or force' that compels performance or a continuance of the ser-
vice."2 0 1 The master must assert "'superior and overpowering force,
constantly present and threatening,"' and the servant must have liter-
ally no choice between service and freedom. 20 2 Under this standard,
psychological coercion-such as threatening deportation as a means of
forcing continued service-could not create the legal state of involun-
tary servitude. 20 3
and willfully hold[ing] to involuntary servitude or sell[ing] into any condition of
involuntary servitude"); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (20000) (prohibiting "two or more per-
sons conspire[ing] to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person ... in the
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States"). Because § 241 prohibits conspiracies to in-
jure constitutional rights, it "incorporates the prohibition of involuntary
servitude contained in the Thirteenth Amendment." Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 940.
With respect to § 1584, "Congress' use of the constitutional language ["involun-
tary servitude"] in a statute enacted pursuant to its constitutional authority to
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment guarantee makes the conclusion that Con-
gress intended the phrase to have the same meaning in both places logical, if not
inevitable." Id. at 945.
197. 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
198. Id. 476-80. According to the court, "[pleonage involves the additional element
that the involuntary servitude is tied to the discharge of an indebtedness." Id. at
481 n.9 (citation omitted). The appellant had hired Mexican families to tend his
20,000 laying hens, requiring work seven days per week, 365 days per year. Id.
at 477. The families were provided housing with cardboard walls and holes in the
floor. Id. at 478. The victims in the case alleged that the appellant threatened
them with deportation to Mexico if they broke their two-year contract. Id. at 477.
199. Id. at 480.
200. Id. at 486 (citing Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)).
201. Id. at 487 (citing Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215-16 (1905)).
202. United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964) (citing Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1, 34 (1906)).
203. Id. Other federal courts have adopted similarly restrictive interpretations of in-
voluntary servitude. See, e.g., United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1167-68
(5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that "[v]arious combinations of physical violence and
of threats of physical violence for escape attempts" are needed).
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On the other end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals approached the concept of involuntary servitude more liberally
in its 1984 decision, United States v. Mussry.2 0 4 In that case, the
court evaluated whether defendants held Indonesian workers in invol-
untary servitude and peonage. 2 05 In crafting its approach to involun-
tary servitude, the Ninth Circuit stressed that methods for
subjugating other people's will have changed from blatant physical
force to more subtle forms of coercion. 2 06 Rejecting the "too narrow"
approach of the Second Circuit in Shackney,20 7 the Ninth Circuit fo-
cused on what it considered "the essence" of involuntary servitude:
"the exercise of control by one individual over another so that the lat-
ter is coerced into laboring for the former."2 08 In particular, the court
considered crucial whether a person "coerce[s] an individual into his
service by subjugating [her] will." 209 Such complete control, the court
reasoned, could be achieved not simply through the use or threat of
force or law, but also through other means of coercion. 2 10 In deciding
whether a person has been coerced into service and "believe [s] that he
or she has no alternative but to perform the labor,"2 1 1 the focus should
be on how "a reasonable person of the same background and experi-
ence"2 12 would be affected by the coercive conduct. Furthermore, be-
cause unlawful coercion is the crux of this analysis, a person's
opportunity to escape the servitude "is not enough in and of itself to
preclude a finding [of] involuntary servitude."2 13
To "resolve [the] conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the mean-
ing of involuntary servitude,"2 14 the Supreme Court granted certiorari
204. 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984).
205. Id. at 1450. According to the indictment in the case, "the defendants unlawfully
held poor, non-English speaking Indonesian servants against their will by entic-
ing them to travel to the United States, paying them little money for their ser-
vices, and withholding their passports and return airline tickets, while requiring
them to work off, as servants, the debts resulting from the costs of their transpor-
tation." Id.
206. See id. at 1452.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984).
210. Id. The court's argument largely paralleled that of Judge Dimock in his concur-
rence in the Shackney decision. See United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 488
(2d Cir. 1964) (Dimock, J., concurring) (noting that "[wihere the subjugation of
the will of the servant is so complete as to render him incapable of making a
rational choice, the servitude is involuntary").
211. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1453.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1454. This relatively relaxed involuntary servitude standard was adopted
by other federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827, 833
(11th Cir. 1985) (concluding that "[viarious forms of coercion may constitute a
holding in involuntary servitude").
214. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939 (1988). The Sixth Circuit in Koz-
minski had essentially adopted the narrow approach of the Second Circuit in
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in United States v. Kozminski.2 15 In reality, however, no significant
disagreement existed among the federal circuits "on the meaning of
involuntary servitude." The courts largely agreed that compelled
work for another person constituted the essence of involuntary servi-
tude.2 16 The only contentious issue was whether federal courts should
look beyond the state of involuntary servitude to inquire how the ser-
vitude became involuntary-and if so, which means of creating invol-
untariness would satisfy the legal standard.
The Court in Kozminski recognized that although the Thirteenth
Amendment was designed primarily to end African slavery, it was not
limited to that purpose. In particular, the words "involuntary servi-
tude" were "intended to extend 'to cover those forms of compulsory la-
bor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to
produce like undesirable results."'2 17 Because the Thirteenth Amend-
ment explicitly excludes forced work as a form of criminal sanction,
the Court determined that "involuntary servitude" includes "at least
situations in which the victim is compelled to work by law."2 18 And
because the Thirteenth Amendment is designed to eradicate condi-
tions "akin to African slavery," combined with the fact that it applies
to private action, the Court determined that "involuntary servitude"
encompasses "compulsion through physical coercion."2 1 9 Requiring ei-
ther legal or physical coercion as a component of involuntary servitude
was consistent, in the Court's view, with its earlier decisions that had
found conditions of involuntary servitude in the context of peonage, a
criminal surety system, and criminal sanctions for failing to perform
work after receiving an advance payment.2 20 Conversely, the Court
concluded that "[tihe guarantee of freedom from involuntary servitude
has never been interpreted specifically to prohibit compulsion of labor
by other means, such as psychological coercion." 22 1 As a result, any
claim of involuntary servitude must also allege "the use or threatened
use of physical or legal coercion."2 22 In its analysis, however, a court
should consider "the victim's special vulnerabilities" as it decides
Shackney, but had added one additional method of creating involuntary servi-
tude: using "fraud or deceit to obtain or maintain services . . . [of] a minor, an
immigrant, or [a person] who is mentally incompetent." United States v. Kozmin-
ski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1987).
215. 487 U.S. 931, 939 (1988).
216. See Page, supra note 186, at 1024.
217. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942 (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)).
218. Id. at 942.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 942-43 (citing and discussing Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905);
United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4
(1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219
(1911)).
221. Id. at 944.
222. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988).
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whether the physical or legal coercion compelled the victim's
service. 22 3
After Kozminski, it was clear that a person claiming involuntary
servitude must allege that her condition was compelled through the
threat or actual use of force or legal coercion. 22 4 Because this stan-
dard forms part of the current law on involuntary servitude, I analyze
below in Section IV.B how claims of sexual harassment in housing
would fare under it. However, the standard established by the Court
in Kozminski is open to criticism. Most obviously, and as discussed
earlier,225 the text of the Thirteenth Amendment provides no support
for a legal analysis of involuntariness that includes certain types of
coercion but excludes others. The most textually consistent approach
in this area would simply inquire whether a person's servitude is truly
involuntary without regard to how the state of involuntariness came
into existence. This approach appears more logical as well, given that
different people react in different ways to different types of coer-
cion. 22 6 Parents, for example, might be quite easily coerced if threats
are made to withhold food or water from their children. In the words
of Justice Brennan, who concurred in the Kozminski decision, "the co-
ercive impact of such threats turns not on any direct physical effect
that would be felt by the laborer but on the psychological [and] emo-
223. Id. at 952. This recognition of the importance of the victim's special vulnerabili-
ties is generally consistent with the Sixth Circuit's third element of involuntary
servitude in Kozminski, which would have included cases where the master uses
"fraud or deceit to obtain or maintain services where the servant is a minor, an
immigrant, or one who is mentally incompetent." 821 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir.
1987).
224. In at least a limited way in the criminal context, Congress has overridden the
Kozminski Court's narrow view of involuntary servitude. In the Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Act (TVPA), which became law in 2000, Congress authorizes the
President to take steps against persons who engage in certain types of human
trafficking. 22 U.S.C. § 7108(a)(1) (2000). For the purposes of the TVPA, Con-
gress has defined "involuntary servitude" broadly to include "any scheme, plan,
or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that, if the person did not enter
into or continue in such condition, that person or another person would suffer
serious harm or physical restraint" or "the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal
process." Id. at § 7102(5). In doing so, Congress noted that the Kozminski deci-
sion narrowly interpreted "involuntary servitude" in the absence of a broader leg-
islative definition. Id. at § 7101(b)(13). The TVPA provides such a definition,
recognizing that "[ilnvoluntary servitude statutes are intended to reach cases in
which persons are held in a condition of servitude through nonviolent coercion."
Id. at § 7101(b)(13). See generally, Kathleen Kim, Psychological Coercion in the
Context of Modern-Day Involuntary Labor: Revisiting United States v. Kozminski
and Understanding Human Trafficking, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 941, 963-71 (2007).
225. See supra Section IV.A.2.
226. Mussry, 26 F.2d at 1453 (noting that "[clonduct other than the use, or threatened
use, or law or physical force may, under some circumstances, have the same effect
as the more traditional forms of coercion-or may be more coercive").
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tional ... injury the laborer would suffer as a result of harm to his...
loved ones."227
Justice Brennan's observation hints at a broader problem with the
involuntary servitude standard established by the Supreme Court.
Although actual force or legal action taken against a victim is suffi-
cient to satisfy the Kozminski test, the Court held that threats of force
or legal action also satisfy the test.228 This is true even though the
Court made clear that psychological coercion, by itself, cannot create
involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment. 2 29 How-
ever, if threats of force or legal action have a coercive value, it lies in
the psychological impact of the threats on the victim. For example, a
victim threatened with violence against herself or her children would
likely comply with the abuser's demands precisely because of the psy-
chologically coercive nature of the demands, not because of the objec-
tive nature of those statements as the "threatened use of physical...
coercion." If we care about the psychological impact of threats-and
the Court appears to in its involuntary servitude standard 230-we
should abandon the artificial distinction between psychological coer-
cion and threats of violence or legal action. Doing so would pave the
way to abandoning all distinctions among types of coercion, with the
resulting focus simply on whether the victim's actions were involun-
tary. And that result, as discussed above, would be consistent with
the plain language of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Finally, to the extent that "involuntary servitude" in the Thir-
teenth Amendment is intended to capture those societal arrangements
"akin to African slavery,"231 there is little sound reason to distinguish
between physical and legal coercion on the one hand and coercion
through psychological, economic, or social means on the other. As dis-
cussed below, the institution of slavery as practiced in the United
States was about more than simply physical violence and a supporting
legal apparatus. It was a thorough system of subordination that oper-
ated on various levels to completely subjugate the will of slaves. To
reinforce that subjugation, masters used a variety of coercive tech-
niques, both physical and nonphysical. Furthermore, the very beat-
227. 487 U.S. 931, 955-56 (1988) (Brennan, J. concurring).
228. Id. at 952-53 (holding that "the jury must be instructed that compulsion of ser-
vices by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion is a necessary
incident of a condition of involuntary servitude").
229. Id. at 944 (noting that "[t]he guarantee of freedom from involuntary servitude
has never been interpreted specifically to prohibit compulsion of labor by other
means, such as psychological coercion").
230. In particular, the Court suggested that the impact of such threats must be viewed
from the subjective perspective of the victim if she suffers from "special disabili-
ties." Id. at 952. The Court also states that its holding "does not imply that evi-
dence of other means of coercion, or of poor working conditions, or of the victim's
special vulnerabilities is irrelevant in a prosecution under these statutes." Id.
231. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916); Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942.
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ings that were so common under slavery were intended to have both
an immediate physical impact on the slave being abused and a
broader psychological impact on the wider slave community. If multi-
ple types of coercion helped create and maintain slavery, it makes lit-
tle sense to now read most of those methods of establishing
involuntariness out of the Thirteenth Amendment.
2. The Scope and Breadth of Servitude
While courts have carefully analyzed what makes servitude invol-
untary under the Thirteenth Amendment, they have largely ignored
parsing the definition of "servitude" itself.23 2 Although servitude is
most commonly used in the context of forced labor, the word is better
understood as having a more nuanced meaning in this context.
In litigation involving the Thirteenth Amendment and its imple-
menting statutes, judicial definitions of "involuntary servitude" al-
most always include the concept of work, labor, or service. In the
Supreme Court's Kozminski decision, for example, Justice O'Connor
clarified the phrase "involuntary servitude" as "necessarily mean[ing]
a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the
defendant by the use or threat of [legal or physical harm] ."233 Lower
courts have been equally focused on the concept or labor, explaining
that "[t]he essence of. . . involuntary servitude is the exercise of con-
trol by one individual over another so that the latter is coerced into
laboring for the former,"234 and that "the worker must labor against
his will for the benefit of another."23 5 According to this perspective,
the Thirteenth Amendment was designed "to prevent the reappear-
ance of forced labor in whatever new form it might take."23 6
This judicial attention to work might be partially explained by the
fact that almost all litigation addressing involuntary servitude has in-
volved traditional forms of labor in extreme or sometimes barbaric cir-
cumstances-for example, migrant or domestic workers kept in
degrading or confined settings. 237 To this extent, the use of "Work" or
232. See McConnell, supra note 177, at 221.
233. 487 U.S. at 952 (emphasis added).
234. United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
235. Wicks v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 231 F.2d 130, 138 (9th Cir. 1956) (emphasis added).
236. United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
237. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 472 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding a condition of
involuntary servitude when defendant hired garment factory workers and then
controlled all aspects of their lives, including their comings and goings from the
compound and when and whether they would eat or be paid); United States v.
Flores, 199 F.3d 1328 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming conviction for violating involun-
tary servitude statute where agricultural workers were threatened that if they
tried to leave, they would be "hunted down and killed"); United States v. Alzanki,
54 F.3d 994 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding conviction of defendant for conspiring to
hold domestic worker in involuntary servitude where she was forced to work fif-
teen hours each day, without adequate food or water, and was prohibited from
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"labor" by courts may simply be descriptive of the particular facts
before them and may not be intended to limit or define the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment. But even if courts are simply being descrip-
tive in some cases, it is also true that judges often seem to go out of
their way to stress the labor component of involuntary servitude. In
1911, for example, the Supreme Court discussed the purposes under-
lying the Thirteenth Amendment: "to make labor free, by prohibiting
that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or
coerced for another's benefit, which is the essence of involuntary servi-
tude."238 Accordingly, there seems to be little doubt that current doc-
trine interpreting both the Thirteenth Amendment and its
implementing federal legislation 2 39 equates the servitude component
of "involuntary servitude" with traditional forms of labor.24 0
Accepting this interpretation at face value, I analyze below in Sec-
tion IV.B whether sexual harassment as experienced by female te-
nants could reasonably be described as "servitude" under the
Thirteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether ser-
vitude in this context should properly be considered a synonym for
labor. From a textual perspective, such an interpretation appears un-
necessarily narrow. Servitude and labor are different, but perhaps re-
lated, concepts. Servitude may be more commonly understood as "a
condition in which one lacks liberty to determine one's course of action
or way of life."241 That general definition is consistent with how the
word "servitude" is interpreted in the related real property context. In
that setting, a servitude is "a charge or burden on an estate for an-
other's benefit."2 42 Perhaps a more accurate way to envision servi-
making contact with the outside world). See also, McConnell, supra note 177, at
214 (observing that the "typical involuntary servitude case involves an otherwise
legitimate employer/employee relationship" and "frequently involve[s] immigrant
and impoverished agricultural or domestic workers.").
238. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911). See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4,
17-18 (1944) (explaining that "[tihe undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free
and voluntary labor throughout the United States").
239. The Supreme Court has made clear that statutory prohibitions against involun-
tary servitude should be construed consistently with the original understanding
of the Thirteenth Amendment. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931,
941 (1988) (explaining the need "to ascertain the precise definition of [the rele-
vant federal statute] by looking to the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment prohi-
bition of involuntary servitude").
240. As explained by the Third Circuit, the "prohibition against involuntary servitude
has always barred forced labor through physical coercion." Steirer v. Bethlehem
Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 998 (3d Cir. 1993).
241. Merriam-Webster Online, http://mwl.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/servitude.
But see BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1402 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "involuntary servi-
tude" as "tlhe condition of one forced to labor-for pay or not-for another by
coercion or improvement").
242. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1370 (8th ed. 2004).
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tude is as a condition in which a person lacks liberty or free will and
is, as a result, subject to the master's control for the master's
benefit. 2 43
As articulated by Professor Joyce McConnell in her critique of legal
protections for battered women, equating involuntary servitude with
forced work probably stems from a conception of African chattel slav-
ery as primarily or even exclusively a system of compelled labor for
southern planters.244 In this view, slavery was essentially an eco-
nomic institution limited to the "public sphere" or marketplace. 245 Al-
though slaves provided an enormous amount of free labor to their
masters, slavery as an institution included abusive and destructive
private dimensions as well.246 As discussed more fully in the follow-
ing section, female slaves were subject to complete physical subjuga-
tion, including a loss of reproductive and sexual autonomy. This
private sphere exploitation reinforced slavery's central pillars: domi-
nation of the slaveholder and the utter subjugation and inferiority of
the slave.247 In this light, slavery was about power and control, not
just labor. And to the extent the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
against involuntary servitude has been interpreted as proscribing
similar conditions, 2 48 the legal application of involuntary servitude
should stress control and subjugation, rather than merely the narrow
concept of labor.
3. Sexual Subjugation and Abuse During Slavery
Life on the plantation was, fundamentally, a system of subordina-
tion based on race and gender.2 49 The white patriarch exercised com-
243. This general definition is consistent with one provided by Akhil Reed Amar and
Daniel Widawsky in their essay arguing for an application of the Thirteenth
Amendment to cases of child abuse. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 177, at
1365 (defining "slavery" for their purposes as "[a] power relation of domination,
degradation, and subservience, in which human beings are treated as chattel, not
persons").
244. See McConnell, supra note 177, at 212-13.
245. See id. at 213-14.
246. See id. at 214 (explaining that "slavery was not simply an economic system of free
labor, but was also a complex social system").
247. See id. at 219 (explaining that "[a]s important as legal ownership was, the slave-
holders' belief in their moral right of ownership, in their natural superiority, and
in the African-Americans' natural inferiority provided the justification for daily
degradation and subjugation").
248. See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916) (explaining that "involuntary servi-
tude" was intended to prohibit all conditions "akin to African slavery").
249. See generally HARRIET A. JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAvE GIRL 18
(Jean Fagan Yellin ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (1861) (explaining her defi-
ance in the face of her master's expression of dominance: "When he told me that I
was made for his use, made to obey his command in every thing; that I was noth-
ing but a slave, whose will must and should surrender to his, never before had my
puny arm felt half so strong."); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY-
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plete control over his plantation and everyone working and living
there. This dominion included the realm of marital relations, where a
wife's obedience and submission to her husband were expected and
demanded.250 The planter's control and dominance over all aspects of
his wife's existence led some southern mistresses to analogize their
lives to those of slaves.251 The significant power imbalance in this
context is reflected in Congressional debates on the Thirteenth
Amendment, when Congressmen expressed fear that if the Amend-
ment were enacted, "a woman would be equal to a man" and "[a] wife
would be equal to her husband."252 The planter's control over his
realm was strengthened by the largely rural nature of southern soci-
ety. The plantation was a freestanding unit of both production and
reproduction, isolating those who lived and worked there from regular
contact with the outside world. 25 3
Of course, whatever hardships and disabilities white women exper-
ienced on the plantation paled in comparison to those suffered by
slaves, whose status as property brought them under the complete do-
RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 38 (1997) (recounting one
slave's description of the institution: it meant "that I was never to consult my own
will, but was, while I lives, to be entirely under the control of another"); KENNETH
M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION-SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH
145 (Vintage Books 1964) (1956) (explaining that planters tried to "implant in the
bondsmen themselves a consciousness of personal inferiority").
250. See Jane Turner Censer, "Smiling Through Her Tears" Ante-Bellum Southern
Women and Divorce, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 24, 25 (1981) (recounting a study of
southern men's attitudes toward women that stressed the benefits of "feminine,
submissiveness, and dependence"). Divorce records from this time period also
reflect the common sentiment that wives should be submissive to their husbands.
See id. at 39 (citing one case where a southern judge refused to grant a divorce,
noting the wife's "want of conformity to [her husband's] wishes") (emphasis
omitted)).
251. See, e.g., Nell Irvin Painter, Introduction to THE SECRET EYE-THE JOURNAL OF
ELLA GERTRUDE CLANTON THOMAS, 1848-1889 34 (Virginia Ingraham Burr ed.,
1990) (recounting that Ella Gertrude Clanton Thomas, a rich planter's wife, "saw
gender hierarchy as natural and right" and "wrote approvingly of her husband as
her 'master,' to whom she looked up, and of her 'woman's weakness protected by
man's superior strength'"); DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN? FEMALE
SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 15 (1985) (explaining that "[slo inhibitive were
society's norms that many women's rights advocates likened the husband-wife
relationship to that of master and slave"); Susan Hamilton, Making History with
Frances Power Cobbe: Victorian Feminism, Domestic Violence, and the Language
of Imperialism, 43 VICTORIAN STUDIES 437, 453 (2001) ("[Blound and silent slave
and the white woman argued for their shared position as property, as bodies that
could be bought, sold, and owned.... Enslaved women's sexual vulnerability
becomes a sign of what is understood but largely unarticulated in feminist com-
munities: the inability of the free white woman to own her own body in
marriage.").
252. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., lst Sess. 1488 (1864) (statement of Sen. Howard).
253. See ELIZABETH Fox-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD-BLACK AND
WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 38 (1988).
20081
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
minion of their masters. 25 4 As part of this domination, slaves lost con-
trol of their bodies-both publicly, in terms of the labor they were
required to undertake in the fields or in the kitchen and privately, in
terms of their physical vulnerability.255 In this latter area, as has
been well documented, slaves were regularly subjected to beatings and
physical punishment.256 But for black females, life on the plantation
was even worse. 25 7 As they lost their physical autonomy, slaves also
lost all meaningful control over their reproductive freedom, leaving
them vulnerable to sexual assault. In the words of one writer, "there
is no slavery without sexual depravity."25s
On a pragmatic level, slaves were money, which translated into
status in southern society.25 9 Their forced labor was considered an
asset, and slave owners treated them like market commodities. Each
slave was assigned a dollar value, and their births and deaths were
recorded in the owner's ledger books as profits and losses. 260 Because
254. See STAMPP, supra note 249, at 141 ("Short of deliberately killing or maliciously
maiming them, the owner did have almost absolute power over his chattels.").
255. Slaves' bodies were not just the focal point of the master's control; they were also
used to express rebellion and independence, if only to limited degrees. For exam-
ple, "outlaw slave parties" were occasionally held late at night and away from the
eyes and ears of slave owners. See Stephanie M. H. Camp, The Pleasures of Re-
sistance: Enslaved Women and Body Politics in the Plantation South, 1830-1861,
in NEW STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 87, 87-114, 90 (Edward E.
Baptist & Stephanie M. H. Camp eds., 2006) (describing how these parties al-
lowed the body to become "an important site not only of suffering but also (and
therefore) of resistance, enjoyment, and potentially transcendence").
256. See, e.g., LAY My BURDEN DowN-A FOLK HISTORY OF SLAVERY 75 (B. A. Botkin
ed., 1945) (recounting incidents of whippings, as well as the shooting of his own
mother when she collapsed during a long walk with swollen and bloody feet:
"Then Massa, he just take out he gun and shot her, and whilst she lay dying he
kicks her two-three times and say, 'Damn a nigger what can't stand nothing.'").
Pregnant slaves were not exempt from physical punishment on the plantation.
See ROBERTS, supra note 249, at 39-40 (providing one ex-slave's account of such
punishment: "Dey... would dig a hole in de ground just big 'nufffo' her stomach,
make her lie face down an whip her on de back to keep from hurtin' de child");
STAMPP, supra note 246, at 171-77 (discussing the penalties meted out to disobe-
dient slaves, including the use of chains, irons, stocks, and whippings).
257. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, & CLASS 6 (Vintage Books 1983) (explaining
that masters treated their female slaves expediently: requiring them to labor
alongside men in the fields, but also to be available for exploitation, punishment,
and repression "in ways suited only for women"); JACOBS, supra note 249, at 77
("Slavery is terrible for men; but it is far more terrible for women. Superadded to
the burden common to all, they have wrongs, and sufferings, and mortifications
peculiarly their own.").
258. GILBERTO FREYRE, THE MASTERS AND THE SLAVES 324 (1965).
259. See STAMPP, supra note 249, at 385-86.
260. See ROBERTS, supra note 249, at 24; STAMPP, supra note 246, at 326 (providing the
following examples of planters' reactions to the deaths of their slaves, reactions
that indicated grief mostly about their loss of property: "Dick died last night,
curse such luck"; "Mary's son, Richard, died tonight. Oh! my losses almost make
me crazy.").
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children born to slaves were legally considered the property of the
mother's owner,2 6 1 the female slave held value measured both by her
ability to work and her present and future reproductive capacity. 26 2
As explained by one pro-slavery source at the time, "[t]he most produc-
tive feature of slave property is the generative belly."263 More slave
children meant increased labor, greater profitability, and more wealth
for the owner. Thomas Jefferson gave voice to what was surely a com-
mon sentiment at the time: "I consider a woman who brings a child
every two years as more profitable than the best man on the farm."264
By at least one account, planters expected sexual reproduction of their
slaves to generate 5% to 6% of their annual profit. 2 65 Given the ban
on the importation of slaves after 1808, slavery's sustainability liter-
ally depended on the reproductive capacity of existing slaves.266
Whether they were cajoled, 2 6 7 pressured, 268 or forced into childbear-
261. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR-RACE & THE AMERI-
CAN LEGAL PROCESS 44 (1978) (discussing a Virginia law providing that the status
of a child born to an African-American mother depended on whether the mother
was a slave); Margaret A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and
Family Law, 5 LAw & INEQ. 187, 198 (1988).
262. See DAvIs, supra note 257, at 6-7; ROBERTS, supra note 249, at 24, 34. A slave's
offspring, even those not yet born, were considered assets owned by the master,
which could be the subject of testamentary transfers. See STAMPP, supra note
249, at 205 (citing a North Carolina will that included a bequest to the testator's
daughter of "the first child that . . . Charity [a slave] shal have" [sic]).
263. STAMPP, supra note 249, at 205. Because of this focus, female slaves being auc-
tioned were often evaluated with an eye to their ability to bear children. See
WHITE, supra note 251, at 32 (recounting slave buyers "knead[ing] women's
stomachs in an attempt to determine how many children a woman could have,"
and private evaluations of slaves on the auction block by physicians to determine
their reproductive abilities). Sales of infertile slaves were governed by rules simi-
lar to those covering sales of other damaged commodities. See ROBERTS, supra
note 246, at 26-27.
264. ROBERTS, supra note 249, at 25.
265. See id. at 24.
266. See WHITE, supra note 251, at 31, 68 (explaining that "American slavery was de-
pendent on natural increase of the slave population"). The fact that the slave
population increased naturally without the addition of newly imported slaves re-
inforced the common libidinous image of black women. See id. at 31.
267. See ROBERTS, supra note 249, at 25 (recounting that some southern planters be-
stowed on slaves who bore children various rewards, including an extra weekly
ration, a small pig, and small gifts such as calico dresses and hair ribbons); see
also ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS-THE
ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 127-28 (1974) (describing that slaves
often received rewards and benefits for marrying, as marriage was seen as most
conducive both to productive workers and increased fertility among slaves).
268. See ROBERTS, supra note 249, at 26 (arguing that female slaves often felt pressure
to bear children because that made them more profitable and, as a result, less
likely to be sold or traded away from their families); STAMPP, supra note 249, at
333 (explaining that female slaves "regarded the children [of their master or mis-
tress] as security 'against their own banishment from the only home they knew,
and separation from all ties of kindred and habit'").
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ing, female slaves were expected to reproduce for their owners.2 69
Those who "underperformed" were often sold, beaten, or sometimes
even killed.270
Within this general context of subjugation marked specifically by a
loss of physical and sexual autonomy, female slaves were often sexu-
ally victimized by their owners. 2 71 To a significant extent, such vic-
timization was consistent with, and justified by, a common image of
black women in the antebellum south that portrayed them as sexually
promiscuous and governed largely by their libidos.272 This image was
reinforced in the otherwise culturally reserved south by the meager
clothing that slaves often wore, the fact that many slave jobs required
women to "reef up" their skirts and expose their bare legs, and the fact
that female slaves were often stripped naked and physically handled
on the auction block.273 Some slaves were purchased for the purpose
of satisfying their owners' sexual desires, while others simply fell vic-
tim to their masters during the course of their enslavement.2 74 In all
269. See WHITE, supra note 251, at 68 ("Once slaveholders realized that the reproduc-
tive function of the female slave could yield a profit, the manipulation of procrea-
tive sexual relations became an integral part of the sexual exploitation of female
slaves."). Dorothy Roberts reprints one slave's account of being forced, as a six-
teen year-old girl, to share the same quarters with an older male slave. ROBERTS,
supra note 249, at 22. After an initial period of confusion, the young girl was told
by her master that he expected her to bear the older slave's children. In the slave
girl's words, the master told her, "Woman, I's pay big money for you, and I's done
dat for de cause I wants yous to raise me chillens. I's put you to live with Rufus
for dat purpose." Id.
270. See ROBERTS, supra note 249, at 26 (recounting the story of a planter in North
Carolina who ordered a group of female slaves who had not borne children in
several months into a barn, explaining that he intended to flog them to death).
271. See DAVIS, supra note 257, at 25 (recounting with examples that "[v]irtually all
the slave narratives of the nineteenth century contain accounts of slave women's
sexual victimization at the hands of masters and overseers"); Burnham, supra
note 261, at 198-200; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 598-99 (1990). Sexual victimization of female
slaves began as early as the voyages that brought them to America. See WHITE,
supra note 251, at 63.
272. See Peter W. Bardaglio, Rape and the Law in the Old South: "Calculated to Excite
Indignation in Every Heart", 60 J. S. HIST. 749, 757 (1994). Consistent with this
image, many southerners believed that "slave women were lewd and lascivious,
that they invited sexual overtures from white men, and that any resistance they
displayed was mere feigning." See WHITE, supra note 251, at 30.
273. See WHITE, supra note 251, at 31-32. The myth that black women were abnor-
mally promiscuous made it possible for white owners to argue that they never
had to use force or coercion to prompt sexual relationships with female slaves See
id. at 38; see also, CATHERINE CLINTON, THE PLANTATION MISTRESS 208-09 (1982)
(explaining that slaves were often nude around their mistresses with one foreign
visitor commenting that "southern women openly tolerated slave nudity 'without
any apparent embarrassment'").
274. For various reasons, including the fact that the law sanctioned such acts, it is
difficult to quantify the problem of slave women being sexually assaulted by
white men. See WHITE, supra note 251, at 152. Nevertheless, the census of 1860
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cases, the slaves were largely powerless to resist.2 75 Slave narratives
recount both widespread incidents of sexual assaults against slaves
and the beatings inflicted on slaves who mustered the courage to fight
back.2 76 Harriet Jacobs, a former slave, recounted her own suffering
and powerlessness at the hands of her master. When she turned fif-
teen, her owner began his sexual advances towards her:
He tried his utmost to corrupt the pure principles my grandmother had in-
stilled. He peopled my young mind with unclean images, such as only a vile
monster could think of. I turned from him with disgust and hatred. But he
was my master. I was compelled to live under the same roof with him... I
[was] subject to his will in all things. . . [W]here could I turn for
protection? 2 7 7
As perhaps suggested by Jacobs' experiences, sexual abuse en-
dured by slaves was not always meted out through overt violence. In-
stead, masters often used the inherent power imbalance in the owner-
slave relationship to manipulate and coerce female slaves into sexual
relations.278 This was a relatively easy task as owners controlled all
aspects of the slaves' lives, including work assignments, allocations of
clothing and food,279 granting work breaks,280 whom they would
marry,28 1 their ability to travel into town,28 2 and even the remote pos-
reported that 12% of blacks in the slave states were mulattoes, suggesting some
dimension-though clearly an under-representation, since not all sexual assault
resulted in mixed-race children-of the abuse. See STAMPP, supra note 249, at
351.
275. See Painter, supra note 251, at 66 ('The sexual availability of enslaved women
was a function of their powerlessness in society.").
276. See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 249, at 51 (explaining that when a slave girl is "four-
teen or fifteen, her owner, or his sons, or the overseer, or perhaps all of them,
begin to bribe her with presents. If these fail to accomplish their purpose, she is
whipped or starved into submission to their will."); ROBERTS, supra note 249, at
29; Saidiya Hartman, Seduction and the Ruses of Power, 19 CALLALOo 537, 545
(1996) (recounting one slave's response when asked if she knew that sleeping
with someone other than her husband was a sin: "Oh, yes, missis, we know-we
know all about dat well enough; but we do anything to get our poor flesh some
rest from the whip; when he made me follow him into de bush, what use me tell
him no? He have strength to make me.").
277. JACOBS, supra note 249, at 27.
278. See id. (noting that her master "was a crafty man, and resorted to many means to
accomplish his [sexual] purposes. Sometimes he had stormy, terrific ways, that
made his victims tremble; sometimes he assumed a gentleness that he thought
must surely subdue. Of the two, I preferred his stormy moods.").
279. See A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 345-54 (Willie Lee
Rose ed., 1976) (providing an excerpt of instructions provided by Gov. James
Henry Hammond, owner of a large South Carolina plantation, to his overseer,
including details on how much of which food should be provided to slaves, when
allocations of their clothing should be made, and what kinds of religious worship
they should be allowed).
280. See id. at 351 (establishing both the hours of slave labor and the "intermissions"
provided slaves at various times during the year).
281. See id. at 352 (providing an excerpt of instructions from Gov. James Henry Ham-
mond, a South Carolina planter, to his overseer, including that "[plermission
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sibility that they would be freed from the bonds of slavery if they
agreed to a sexual relationship with their owner. 283 One especially
important area of control for many masters was their power over slave
children. Although by most accounts, slave owners preferred to keep
slave families intact to preserve harmony,28 4 they retained the power
to split up families-selling children or their mothers to another slave
owner.2 85 The fear of mistreatment of the victim's children or possible
familial division helped keep female slaves under control and pliable
to the master's wishes.2 8 6 Harriet Jacobs recounted in her diary that
she remained in a sexually abusive and harassing relationship with
her master because of her strong desire to not abandon her own
children.28 7
At least as important in this power imbalance, masters had con-
stant and unfettered access to female slaves everywhere on the plan-
tation.28 8 As a result, female slaves could rarely if ever feel
completely safe and unthreatened. Furthermore, although slave mar-
must always be obtained from the master before marriage, but no marriage will
be allowed with negroes not belonging to the master").
282. See id. at 352-53 (allowing each slave to go into town on one Sunday each year).
283. See WHITE, supra note 251, at 34-36. Of course, female slaves who began sexual
relationships with their masters in the hopes of eventually gaining their freedom
simply reinforced the popular conception of black women as sexually insatiable.
See id. at 34.
284. See FOGEL & ENGERMAN, supra note 267, at 127 (explaining that planters be-
lieved fertility rates among slaves would be highest if families were strong and
intact). Slave owners also often encouraged their slaves to marry, which they
hoped would lead to greater stability and more frequent slave births. See A Doc-
UMENTARY HISTORY OF SLAVERY, supra note 279, at 352 ("Marriage is to be en-
couraged as it adds to the comfort, happiness & health of those who enter upon it,
besides insuring a greater increase.").
285. See LAY My BURDEN DOwN, supra note 256, at 154-55 (recounting the pain and
difficulty accompanying the splitting up of slave families by their masters); Burn-
ham, supra note 258, at 201-02.
286. See Angela Davis, Reflections on the Black Woman's Role in the Community of
Slaves, 3 THE BLACK SCHOLAR 3, 13 (1971) (explaining that female slaves were
easily manipulable "if the master contrived a ransom system of sorts, forcing her
to pay with her body for food, diminished severity in treatment, the safety of her
children, etc.").
287. JACOBS, supra note 249, at 89-90 ("Though the boon [of freedom] would have been
precious to me, above all price, I would not have taken it at the expense of leaving
[my children] in slavery. Every trial I endured, every sacrifice I made for their
sakes, drew them closer to my heart, and gave me fresh courage to beat back the
dark waves that rolled and rolled over me in a seemingly endless night of
storms."); see also WHITE, supra note 251, at 70-71 (describing that female slaves
ran away less frequently than male slaves because "women tended to be more
concerned with the welfare of their children, and this limited their mobility").
288. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 249, at 32 (relating the story of James Odom, a
slave owner from Georgia who sexually harassed one of his female slaves by "in-
vad[ing] her bedroom despite numerous tactics to evade him, including bringing
her children to bed with her, threatening to scream, and nailing up her
windows").
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riages were encouraged, slave women could not, for obvious reasons,
rely on their husbands for any meaningful protection against sexually
coercive or abusive owners.28 9 In this context, female slaves were ut-
terly at the mercy of their owners.
Sexual assault and harassment of female slaves did more than
simply satisfy the sexual urges of planters; such abuse "was primarily
a weapon of terror that reinforced whites' domination over their
human property."29 0 Even if forced sex had the short-term effect of
interfering with the victim's productivity on the plantation, the long-
term effect on the victim, 2 9 1 her powerless spouse, 29 2 and the broader
slave population was to emphasize and strengthen the planter's domi-
nance and control. 293 In this way, the sexual exploitation of slaves by
their masters reinforced the very power imbalance that facilitated
both slavery29 4 and this specific abuse in the first place. 2 95
289. See STAMPP, supra note 249, at 343 (explaining that "[tihe slave husband ... was
not the head of the family, the holder of property, the provider, or the protector");
WHITE, supra note 251, at 153 (describing that slave women "could not depend on
their husbands for protection against whippings or sexual exploitation").
290. DAvis, supra note 257, at 23-24 (explaining that sexual assault "Was a weapon of
domination, a weapon of repression, whose covert goal was to extinguish slave
women's will to resist, and in the process, to demoralize their men"); ROBERTS,
supra note 249, at 29.
291. One scholar has traced the sexual violence meted out by masters to their slaves
back to the feudal "right of the first night," according to which the feudal lord
demonstrated his dominance over the serfs by having sexual intercourse with all
of the females. Davis, supra note 286, at 13.
292. See id. at 13-14 (arguing that sexual assault of female slaves was intended to
destroy any desire to resist in both the victim and her spouse, who "was struck by
his manifest inability to rescue his women from sexual assaults of the master").
293. See ROBERTS, supra note 249, at 29. Exerting this power and control was critical
to maintenance of the master-slave relationship. See STAMPP, supra note 249, at
146 (explaining the need for masters to "awe [slaves] with a sense of their
master's enormous power," and that "[t]he only principle upon which slavery
could be maintained... was the 'principle of fear'").
294. See STAMPP, supra note 249, at 147 (discussing the importance of creating a
"habit of perfect dependence" on the part of slaves, to impress them with their
helplessness).
295. Sexual harassment and violence directed at black women did not end with the
abolition of slavery. In fact, some of the very techniques used by masters were
implemented by white supremacist groups in the years following the Civil War.
See Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/ Gendered Violence: Outraging the Body Pol-
itic in the Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 686 (2001-2002). In par-
ticular, the Ku Klux Klan used rape, sexual assault, simulated intercourse, and
sexualized beatings to establish the continued subjugation of blacks after their
emancipation. See id. at 692, 704-16, 736-44, 745-62.
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B. Involuntary Servitude in the Landlord-Tenant
Relationship
In analyzing whether residential sexual harassment constitutes in-
voluntary servitude-that is, labor compelled by the perpetrator's
threat or use of physical force or legal action 296-a reasonable ques-
tion might be raised as to whether the victim has actually performed
labor for the abuser. In the vast majority of sexual harassment cases,
the explicitly stated goal of the abuser is to force the victim into hav-
ing sexual relations.297 Where that end result is not explicit, we can
reasonably assume that the same goal is implicit, and that all of the
other harassing conduct-including repeated and unsolicited requests
for dates, sexually explicit comments and innuendo, and physical
groping-is intended by the harasser to lay the groundwork for what
he hopes will ultimately be sex.2 98 Assuming that the end goal of sex-
ual harassment is compelled sexual conduct, the question remains
whether such harassment constitutes servitude or labor under the
Thirteenth Amendment.
From a Lockean perspective, each victim of sexual harassment en-
joys a property interest in her body, and her use of her body to satisfy
the demands of her landlord reasonably constitutes labor.2 99 This
view of sex as labor appears potentially objectionable only from the
perspective that sexual conduct may not traditionally be considered a
commodity traded on the open market. Instead such conduct arguably
occurs within the confines of consensual, reciprocal, usually loving re-
lationships and should not, as a result, be classified as labor.3 00 That
296. See supra Subsection IV.A. See also United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931,
953 (1988) (determining that "compulsion of services by the use or threatened use
of physical or legal coercion is a necessary incident of a condition of involuntary
servitude").
297. See, e.g., Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (including allega-
tions that the victim's landlord asked her whether they were "going to do good in
bed"); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Veal Transcript
of Record, supra note 1, at 130-31 (recounting incident where landlord pressed
himself against tenant's backside and groaned).
298. See, e.g., Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *1
(M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005) (alleging that the defendant grabbed the plaintiff, "pulled
her toward him, tried to kiss her, and asked [her] to touch his genitals").
299. See JOHN LOCKE, ON POLITICS AND EDUCATION 88 (Walter J. Black, Inc. 1947)
(explaining that "every man has a 'property' in his own 'person.' This nobody has
any right to but himself. The 'labor' of his body and the 'work' of his hands, we
may say, are properly his."). While the tenant's labor in this context is certainly
coerced-an aspect of this analysis is discussed below-the element of coercion
does not undercut her conduct as "labor." See also McConnell, supra note 177, at
231 (explaining in a related context that "[s]ex is frequently the most significant
service in the battering relationship").
300. But see Allison Moore & Paul Reynolds, Feminist Approaches to Sexual Consent:
A Critical Assessment, in MAKING SENSE OF SEXUAL CONSENT 29, 29 (Mark Cowl-
ing & Paul Reynolds eds., 2004) (presenting and then critiquing one feminist per-
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criticism, however, ignores several realities. First, as is well known,
sexual conduct is a commodity that is freely traded on the market in
some areas. In Nevada, for example, any county with fewer than
400,000 residents may license brothels.30 1 For legal prostitutes, sex is
their work; it is a commodity they trade for money, not out of love for
their customers.30 2 In this way at least some sexual conduct is clearly
commodified within the open market and properly termed labor.30 3
Second, even sexual conduct in consensual, reciprocal relationships
may have a somewhat coercive element to it. In particular, sex often
forms part of the overall bargains and exchanges typical in consensual
relationships. 30 4 Social norms often dictate that men and women of-
fer in exchange sets of "reciprocal services" that frequently include, for
women, "love, affection, sex and reproduction." 30 5 Furthermore, even
if one considers all sexual conduct in consensual relationships to be
noncoercive and freely given, and as a result, something other than
labor, context has to be seen as critical to that determination. What
might be considered a gratuitous expression of affection when occur-
spective that even apparently consensual sexual relationship may "den[y] the
possibility of meaningful consent under the conditions of hetero-patriarchy").
301. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.345 (2007). Furthermore, in Rhode Island, state law
does not prohibit prostitution in brothels and other indoor locations. See Amanda
Milkovits, Legislators Drop Bid to Outlaw Brothels, PROVIDENCE J., June 16,
2005, at A01, available at http://www.projo.com/news/content/projo-20050616-
prostl6.2376e31.html.
302. See Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol & Jane E. Larson, Sexual Labor and Human
Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 391, 424 (2005-2006) ("[T]he bottom line for
any woman in the sex trade is economics. However a woman feels when she fi-
nally gets into the life, it always begins as survival ..." quoting Amber Holli-
baugh, On the Street Where We Live, 5 WOMEN'S REVIEW OF BOOKS 1, 1 (1988)
(book review). But see KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 37
(1995) (describing sexual contact with a prostitute as "sex that is disembodied,
enacted on the bodies of women who, for the men, do not exist as human beings");
Barbara Sullivan, Prostitution and Consent: Beyond the Liberal Dichotomy of
"Free or Forced," in MAKING SENSE OF SEXUAL CONSENT, supra note 300, at 127
(arguing that legal prostitution is inherently coercive).
303. That there is a distinction between the labor and private components of sex may
be reflected in the fact that for some prostitutes, there are certain intimate acts
that they will not undertake outside of relationships with their boyfriends, hus-
bands, or significant others. See BARRY, supra note 302, at 40 (describing one
prostitute's view that "[w]e don't allow kissing, because this is what you can only
do at home") (citation omitted)).
304. See LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS-THE POLITICS OF
SEX 23-28 (1988). As explained by Hirshman and Larson, all sexual relation-
ships-from traditional sex between husband and wife to rape-includes some
degree of bargaining and consent. See id. at 257-64. Furthermore, all of the
other components typically found as part of the consensual, loving, noncoercive
relationship can be and frequently are bought on the open market: cooks, nan-
nies, cleaning services, and babysitters can all be hired. See Hernandez-Truyol &
Larson, supra note 301, at 427.
305. See McConnell, supra note 177, at 230.
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ring between a tenant and her boyfriend might be properly viewed as
a commodity, compelled in a nonconsensual relationship between that
same tenant and her landlord. In essence, the context makes this sex-
ual conduct coerced servitude. 30 6
Without question, victims subjectively consider their enduring of
sexual harassment as compelled service to the landlord for the pur-
poses of maintaining desperately needed shelter. 30 7 Sheila Mc-
Clenton, whose story of sexual harassment at the hands of her
landlord Bobby Veal began this Article, explained exactly why she en-
dured his harassment: "I desperately needed a place to stay. I didn't
have anywhere to go, and my Section VIII was about to expire." An-
other victim of sexual harassment, Kali Underwood, was abused by
her landlord John Koch. After repeated requests and pestering, Un-
derwood reluctantly agreed to raise her shirt for Koch, and he pro-
ceeded to fondle her breasts and masturbate for fifteen minutes.30 8
When asked why she gave in to the harassment, Underwood ex-
plained, "I just thought that's what I had to do to get the house, and he
made it quite clear that there was someone else who was willing to do
lots of things .... [In addition,] I only had a few days left on my
voucher, and me and my niece really needed to move out of... the
house we were in."309
Whether or not the harassment these and other victims endure is
legally considered quid pro quo, it is clear that they understand them-
selves to be trading their bodies for shelter. They are, in essence, com-
pelled to provide a service to the landlord in exchange for continued
occupation of their dwellings. Such behavior does not simply consti-
tute "servitude"; it is also properly qualified as "involuntary," to the
extent they have no meaningful choice3 1O other than to endure the
306. See id. at 231 (explaining that although reciprocal services are voluntarily traded
in consensual intimate relationships, such services are coerced and forced in the
context of battering relationships).
307. See Veal Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 271-72 (explaining that one victim
refused to report the abusive conduct because of a fear that she would lose her
housing: "[Sihe felt that Mr. Veal would retaliate, and she didn't have anywhere
else to go. She was in the process of... finding a place or moving, and she had
children, and she was expecting at the time, and she did not want to be retaliated
against."). Refusing the sexual advances of her landlord often brings threatened
or actual negative consequences on the tenant. See, e.g., Grieger v. Sheets, No. 87
C 6567, 1989 WL 38707, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1989) (alleging that the landlord
stopped making repairs in the victim's apartment when she rejected his physical
advances).
308. See Transcript of Record at 12-14, United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D.
Neb. 2004) (No. 8:03CV406) [hereinafter "Koch Transcript of Record"] (Testi-
mony of Kali Underwood).
309. Id. at 15, 20 (Testimony of Kali Underwood).
310. The issue of choice in this context is somewhat troubling. It is true, of course,
that unless the victim of sexual harassment is literally kept under lock and key
(and most are not), she always has the "choice" to leave her home or apartment
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harassment or risk losing their homes and, as they often fear, govern-
mental housing assistance. In particular, predatory landlords prey on
the overwhelming fear that many mothers feel about not protecting
their children. In the words of one victim who was sexually harassed
by her landlord, "I kept thinking, 'If I'm nicer to him, I could stay,
because he said, 'We can work on it."'... He touched my body parts. I
did it for my kids."311
As discussed earlier,312 despite the powerful manipulative effect of
purely psychological or economic coercion, current Supreme Court doc-
trine recognizes only the threatened or actual use of force or legal co-
ercion as valid means of establishing involuntary servitude. 3 1 3
Accordingly, while many victims of sexual harassment unquestionably
feel compelled to endure abusive conduct for the well being of their
families,3 14 they would receive Thirteenth Amendment protection
only if the abuser's conduct can be wedged into the category of coer-
cion established by the Court. Overall, that should not prove to be an
insurmountable burden. In many, if not most cases of sexual harass-
ment, the landlord intertwines harassing conduct with threats that
the victim's housing may be lost if she resists.
and thus end the abuse. Taken one step further, this argument might posit that
the victim of residential sexual harassment is actually maximizing her utility by
consenting to the abuse in exchange for housing, perhaps larger or more comfort-
able housing than she might otherwise be able to afford. However, especially
vulnerable victims of sexual harassment in housing consent to their harassment
only in the extraordinarily limited way that all victims of sexual violence may
theoretically bargain with their abusers-to the extent that "a concession made
under threat of death or violence [is] consent." HIRSHMAN & LARSON, supra note
304, at 259. Such limited consent has to be viewed as largely meaningless. Fur-
thermore, federal doctrine on involuntary servitude makes clear that the focus
should be not on whether the victim could have walked away, but on whether her
will was subjugated. See, e.g., United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1167-68
(5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that "tviarious combinations of physical violence and
of threats of physical violence for escape attempts are sufficient" to satisfy the
standard of involuntary servitude). As a result, any nominal "choice" that victims
may have in this context is legally irrelevant.
311. Laszewski, supra note 94.
312. See supra Subsection IV.A.1.
313. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 953 (1988). If, instead, the inquiry
were whether servitude is rendered involuntary by any means, victims of resi-
dential harassment would have little difficulty satisfying this standard.
314. See, e.g., Veal Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 324 (providing victim's ac-
count that "I felt like once again I had let my kids down, because if I had just
went with the flow, they would still have everything .... [Ilt was my fault that
they had to start from scratch..."); id. at 491 (explaining that "I didn't want to be
homeless anymore, and I didn't want to have to be separated from my children
again .... [I] just was contemplating just killing myself, because I didn't know
what to do. I didn't want to be homeless, and I didn't want .. .to get put out
because I didn't ... have sex with Mr. Veal.").
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Sometimes those threats are explicit. Ebony Dishmon, for exam-
ple, fell behind on rent she owed to her landlord, John Koch.315 Koch
repeatedly offered to forgive the outstanding balance in exchange for
"oral or regular sex."3 16 After Dishmon refused those offers, Koch fi-
nally threatened eviction: "He told me that if I didn't come up with
something soon, that-which was either me paying him some money
within the next week or two, or me having sex with him within the
next week or two, that he was going to draw up eviction papers."317
The coercive impact of Koch's harassment was clear to Dishmon: "I
felt like he was taking advantage of the situation to where if I didn't
have the money, I would feel like I had to do whatever he sexually
wanted me to do for me to be able to keep a house for my children."3 18
Other times, the landlord conveys the same message implicitly, such
as when the tenant falls behind in rent and the landlord offers alter-
native ways to "pay." Lisa Carroll, another victim of John Koch, testi-
fied that when she could not keep up with her monthly rent, her
landlord told her, "[Y]ou know what we could do-what you could do
to get this rent paid."3 19 Although the two did not expressly discuss
sex for rent, Carroll understood that one way to keep her house was to
engage in sex with her landlord. 3 20
In all of these cases, the abusing landlord made either explicit or
implicit threats that if the victims did not give in to his demands, they
would lose their housing. That dangling threat of eviction constantly
hangs over the heads of poor, desperate tenants and is, in fact, what
makes the coercive nature of the landlord's conduct so compelling.
But the important aspect of this analysis for Thirteenth Amendment
purposes is that the landlord can evict the tenant in one of only two
ways: by using self-help himself to lock her out or by instituting evic-
tion proceedings in the appropriate local court.3 2 1 If he locks her out,
he has used a degree of force against her by physically blocking her
access to the house or apartment. Some courts have found even the
most apparently non-violent instances of self-help to be nonpeace-
315. Koch Transcript of Record, supra note 308, at 12 (Testimony of Ebony Dishmon).
316. Id. at 13.
317. Id. at 18.
318. Id.
319. Koch Transcript of Record, supra note 308, at 7 (Testimony of Lisa Carroll). See
also id. at 11 (Testimony of Anita Thomas) (testifying that Koch told her "there
were things [she] could do for [him]" to assist with inspection problems).
320. Id. at 7 (Testimony of Lisa Carroll).
321. See Randy G. Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Evic-
tion Process A Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41
UCLA L. REV. 759, 764 (1994) (explaining that the national trend is to discourage
use of lockouts by landlords in favor of reliance on summary eviction
proceedings).
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able.3 22 If, alternatively, the landlord chooses formal eviction pro-
ceedings, that by definition is a legal process, involving the filing of a
complaint and the taking of evidence during a trial.323 Either way,
the landlord's sexual harassment has behind it, ultimately, either the
threat of force-by way of physical eviction and locking out the vic-
tim-or the threat that the legal system will be utilized to remove the
tenant through summary eviction proceedings. Those underlying
threats fall squarely within the Supreme Court's cramped view of "in-
voluntary servitude" as requiring "the use or threatened use of physi-
cal or legal coercion."3 24
V. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment in the rental context reasonably constitutes in-
voluntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment. For victims,
their servitude is their endurance of crude, sexually explicit comments
and innuendo, repeated requests for dates or sexual encounters, and
even physical assaults and rape. In exchange for their servitude, vic-
tims hope to protect their children and avoid becoming homeless.
Predatory landlords know those weaknesses, and they exploit them,
targeting the most desperate and vulnerable victims. Once the abuse
begins, the victim is slowly worn down over time by the degrading and
constantly sexual nature of her environment and the always present
threat-stated or not-that if she does not relent, she and her chil-
dren will lose their home. When the victim gives in to her exploita-
tion, her will has been subjugated.
The Thirteenth Amendment might be considered an unlikely
source of protection for female renters suffering sexual harassment in
this context. Indeed, in the present judicial and political climate-
where federal courts are rolling back traditional FHA protections and
HUD has stalled the publication of final rules governing residential
sexual harassment claims for over seven years-legal arguments
grounded in progressive interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment
might appear to be long-shots at best. Nevertheless, for at least two
reasons, the arguments contained in this Article should be advanced.
First, they are historically and textually justified. The Thirteenth
Amendment is not simply a relic of history, relevant today only to bet-
ter understand the past. Instead, the Thirteenth Amendment was
322. See, e.g., Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 148, 150 (Minn. 1978) (concluding that
lockout was not conducted in a peaceable manner where the tenant was not pre-
sent at the time that landlord entered the premises with an accompanying lock-
smith and police officer).
323. See Mary B. Spector, Tenants'Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction
and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REv. 135, 157-58 (2000) (discussing both
the development and current procedures of summary evictions).
324. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 953 (1988).
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drafted and intended to abolish not just African chattel slavery, but all
forms of involuntary servitude. Through cramped and narrow judicial
decisions and careful advocacy, that promise of equality and protec-
tion has been stifled. This Article joins others before it in arguing for
an expansive but accurate application of the Thirteenth Amendment
to realize its true liberating potential. Even if courts today are unwill-
ing to embrace the Thirteenth Amendment in contexts outside African
chattel slavery or traditional forms of forced labor, these arguments
should continue to be made with the hope that one day courts may
listen.
Second, casting arguments in terms of the Thirteenth Amendment
is important for the victims. Society has a tendency to overlook resi-
dential sexual harassment, most likely because it disproportionately
affects poor, single, and nonwhite women. But their plight is real.
Victims of residential sexual harassment find themselves in a form of
bondage, trapped in a cycle of sexual violence and degradation. Their
poverty, family responsibilities, and desperation for housing make
them easy prey for controlling and abusive landlords looking to exploit
their weaknesses. When they endure sexual harassment to keep a
roof over their children's heads, they risk both physical injury and ex-
treme psychological trauma. As the victim accounts discussed in this
Article reflect, sexual harassment that invades the home can have
devastating and long-term consequences for the victim and her family.
By describing such abuse as "involuntary servitude," the physical and
mental anguish of victims will hopefully resonate with courts strug-
gling to define the scope of the law's protections.
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